Leveraging Legitimacy: How Alaska Circumvented Salmon Sustainability By Creating Their Own Eco-Label by Couture, Monique
Western Washington University 
Western CEDAR 
WWU Graduate School Collection WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship 
Spring 2016 
Leveraging Legitimacy: How Alaska Circumvented Salmon 
Sustainability By Creating Their Own Eco-Label 
Monique Couture 
Western Washington University, couturesb@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Couture, Monique, "Leveraging Legitimacy: How Alaska Circumvented Salmon Sustainability By Creating 
Their Own Eco-Label" (2016). WWU Graduate School Collection. 500. 
https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet/500 
This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the WWU Graduate and Undergraduate 
Scholarship at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in WWU Graduate School Collection by an 











How Alaska Circumvented Salmon Sustainability  









Accepted in Partial Completion 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 












Chair, Dr. Sara Singleton 
 
 
Dr. Don Alper 
 
 












In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master’s degree at 
Western Washington University, I grant to Western Washington University the non-exclusive 
royalty-free right to archive, reproduce, distribute, and display the thesis in any and all forms, 
including electronic format, via any digital library mechanisms maintained by WWU. 
 
I represent and warrant this is my original work, and does not infringe or violate any rights of 
others. I warrant that I have obtained written permissions from the owner of any third party 
copyrighted material included in these files.  
 
I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of this work, including but not 
limited to the right to use all or party of this work in future works, such as articles or books.  
 
Library users are granted permission for individual, research and non-commercial reproduction 
of this work for education purposes only. Any further digital posting of this document requires 
specific permission from the author.  
 
Any copying or publication of this thesis for commercial purposes, or for financial gain, is not 





       Monique Couture  

























How Alaska Circumvented Salmon Sustainability  










Presented to  
The Faculty of  






In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 























Eco-labelling programs have become an important market mechanism of environmental 
governance. The Alaska salmon eco-certification case study provides a rich opportunity to 
analyze whether industry created eco-labelling programs can foster legitimate resource 
sustainability. This paper investigates the motives of the Alaska industry in the withdrawal of 
the salmon fisheries from the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, and creation 
of an Alaska label in 2011. It is argued that Alaska circumvented salmon sustainability by 
creating its own eco-label. This paper suggests the motive for the emergence of a new 
fisheries eco-certification initiative was to gain an eco-label through less 
stringent conformance criteria. In this case, Alaska sought to certify fisheries engaged in 
industrial hatcheries, which are harming wild stocks, as sustainable. Finally, market 
mechanism disciplinary discourse logic implies both a ratcheting up of market-wide 
environmental performance and legitimacy. This study illuminates an intriguing example of 
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Introduction 
 
Due to the sheer number of stakeholders, huge financial interests, and significant 
sustainability concerns present within the industry, the Alaska salmon eco-certification case 
study is complex. Transparency and a full understanding of this case study is critical to 
progress in the environmental governance field in order to determine if state and industry 
owned eco-labelling programs can actually be meaningful. This research attempts to 
understand the motives behind the recent emergence of territorial eco-labelling schemes that 
are thought to have been created due to dissatisfaction with the MSC.  The rejection of 
independent sustainability certification in favor of an approach that is essentially industry 
controlled and State of Alaska owned provides a conundrum because accountable and 
reliable sustainability certifications in the global market are a necessity for eco-labels to work 
in addressing environmental problems. 
This thesis investigates and analyzes the reasons that the major Alaska salmon 
processors withdrew from the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) recertification process in 
2012 and created the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization based Responsible 
Fisheries Management (FAO-based RFM) certification. My research proposes that there are 
factors beyond the reason of the cost of the MSC certification that resulted in Alaska salmon 
processors withdrawing from the MSC certification and creating the FAO-based RFM 
certification. This Alaska salmon case study documents and analyzes the events that occurred 
during the simultaneous second reassessment of the MSC certification in 2012, and the 
emergence of Alaska’s FAO-based RFM certification. This archival evidence provides a rich 
opportunity to analyze whether or not an industry owned eco-label, as a neoliberal tool of 
global environmental governance, can actually serve a legitimate function.  
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Further analysis into the Alaska salmon eco-certification case is needed to address 
two important aspects and implications of eco-labels as a form of global environmental 
governance.  First, an investigation into whether or not the processors initial withdrawal from 
the MSC was motivated by the possibility of failing to meet MSC sustainability criteria. 
Second, a determination of whether or not the new Alaska eco-label generates the assumed 
ratcheting up of market-wide environmental performance and legitimacy. By analyzing these 
two aspects, a new motivation for pursuing alternative eco-label schemes could be 
illuminated. It could also reveal a discrepancy in the logic of market mechanisms associated 
with disciplinary discourses. Through these lenses, it is argued that Alaska circumvented 
salmon sustainability by creating its own eco-label. 
The MSC has become an important topic for academic analysis given their 
dominance in the wild capture fisheries sector (Foley and Herbert 2013; Foley 2011; 
Gutierrez et al. 2012; Gulbrandsen 2005; Ponte 2012).  As the MSC eco-label has expanded 
to fisheries worldwide, alternative third party certification and labeling processes have 
emerged. These third party certification systems provided opportunities for profitable 
commerce and competition among existing certification and inspection firms (Mutersbaugh 
et al. 2005). This rise in eco-labels has resulted in competition for legitimacy, as eco-label 
organizations battle for credibility and market share. There is agreement in the academic 
literature that the creation and proliferation of non-governmental standard setting 
certification and labelling organizations, like the MSC, are connected to broad worldwide 
transformations in governance, that are in turn associated with globalization (Foley 2011).  
Eco-labels are an important tool in this new form of global environmental 
governance. Voluntary eco-labeling as a standard and certification scheme relies on third 
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party certification to gain credibility and legitimacy. Environmental governance differs from 
traditional governance, which is defined as any kind of state or non-state institutional 
arrangement, laws and regulations. Environmental governance is a neoliberal approach to 
environmental policy that de-emphasizes centralized government and other forms of 
traditional environmental policymaking. Regulation of the environment has shifted to private 
actors, or a joint-public-private undertaking, relying on market-based mechanism of third 
party certification. Foley (2011) identifies two important market mechanisms associated with 
disciplinary discourses on labelling and asserts eco-labels are assumed to generate both a 
ratcheting up of market-wide environmental performance and convey legitimacy to 
consumers. 
The Alaska salmon fishery was one of the first fisheries in the world to receive MSC 
certification in 2000, and was the first large volume fishery of commercial significance to be 
certified. The future of MSC certified Alaska salmon became uncertain when the fishery 
struggled to recertify in 2012.  Since 2010, the Alaska salmon fishery has experienced a 
period of imbalance, with four transfers between sponsoring organizations occurring. The 
sustainability processes involves a conformity assessment body (CAB) and a client- an entity 
that takes responsibility for having or maintaining the sustainability certification.   
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) was the original organization 
responsible for maintaining the Alaska salmon MSC certification.  The first transfer occurred 
in 2010, from the ADF&G to the Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation (AFDF). Then 
in 2012 the client role was transferred to the Purse Seine Vessel Owners Association 
(PSVOA). The final transfer occurred in 2014 to the current organization, the Alaska Salmon 
Processors Association (ASPA).  
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The certification process is time consuming. It requires an annual surveillance report 
and a full assessment of the fishery every five years. A frequently cited criticism of the MSC 
certification program is the cost, specifically the required fishery assessments and the MSC 
eco-label use fees. The processors that withdrew from the MSC certification aligned with the 
ASMI’s FAO-based RFM certification. To further establish legitimacy and credibility, ASMI 
utilized Global Trust in the capacity of an independent and third party certification body. 
Global Trust is a privately owned company with the mission, “to service the needs of 
industry and to bridge the gap through certification.” 
This research supports Foley and Havice’s (2016) analysis of what motivates the new 
fisheries eco-certifications that are emerging forms of what might be conceptualized as 
territorial sustainability governance. This paper builds off Vandergeest, Ponte and Simon’s 
(2015) analysis of four case studies from around the world that found some state agencies to 
be suspicious of sustainability certification, and others to have embraced it or even used it to 
extend their sovereignty. This work brings Foley and Herbert’s (2013) initial investigation of 
alternative regimes of transnational environmental certification in Alaska’s salmon fisheries 
to date. While their investigation began to understand the stakeholder dynamics and 
underlying tensions between the MSC and Alaska stakeholders, this research provides a 
counter-argument that costs were not the primary reason that the processors withdrew from 
MSC certification. In addition, that Alaska’s new label has gone against the disciplinary 
discourse logic in actually ratcheting down market wide performance and legitimacy.  
Alaska is known for its libertarian views and desire for independence. As a result, 
they specifically do not like being told what to do by outside environmental players. ASMI 
may have created the Alaska label in response to the, dominance, ascent and cost of the 
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MSC. However, the frequently cited factor of cost serves as a distraction to the sustainability 
issues that are present in the Alaska salmon fishery. This paper shows that the cost of the 
MSC is not the only reason the Alaska stakeholders strongly opposed the MSC certification 
and went on to create the FAO-based RFM certification. Due to the fundamental differences 
between industry and conservation interests, research in environmental politics can shine 
light on the effectiveness of neoliberal market mechanisms within the field of environmental 
governance. This work contributes to understanding the gap that exists between these 
conflicting interests through investigating the motives that brought about the move from the 
MSC to the RFM label in the Alaska salmon fishery.   
Methodology 
 Empirical data for this thesis was obtained using a combination of methodological 
approaches and sources, including a non-random survey of Alaska stakeholders. The 
theoretical and historical documents used in this study are available in books and academic 
journals.  Research included both academic and ‘grey literature,’ including studies on the 
governance of fisheries produced by consultancy firms, international organizations and 
government agencies. Primary and statistical data available through the Internet includes 
published reports and documents produced by the MSC, government departments and 
agencies and professional certification firms. Data from the Internet was also used from 
public reports produced by international organizations such as the FAO and environmental 
organizations. Following research techniques of Foley (2011), sources of data also included 
subscriptions to seafood industry news websites, magazines and newsletters, which he 
advocates have been underutilized in the existing academic literature on the MSC.   
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I created a ten-question survey that was distributed to a group of key informants (see 
appendix). It was strictly confidential and administered through ‘survey monkey’ to 
interview selected Alaska salmon stakeholders. Survey participants were identified in the 
literature and news publications on marine eco-labels and Alaska salmon. Stakeholders from 
all user groups were contacted, including: fishermen associations, business interests, 
scientists, hatcheries and environmental organizations. Realizing the specialized and 
sensitive nature of this research topic, and that it may be difficult to identify a large number 
of respondents, the snowball technique was employed. Those interviewed were asked to refer 
anybody they knew who was knowledgeable on the topic. This method worked in identifying 
and contacting additional stakeholders. Contact was attempted for at least three individuals 
from each stakeholder group, for a total of 41 people. 23 stakeholders participated in this 
study. The response rate was 49 percent. The informed consent form is also available in the 
appendix.   
The following conceptual framework grounds the case study of Alaska salmon into 
the environmental governance literature. The first section introduces eco-labels as a system 
of global environmental governance. The second addresses how eco-labelling systems 
achieve legitimacy.  The third section provides insights into the politics of eco-certification 
through details of the rise of new territorial eco-certifications in Iceland, Japan and Alaska. 
Together, these three sections comprise a literature review on eco-labels and global 
environmental governance, the legitimacy of eco-label certification systems and the rise of 





Eco-labels as a System of Global Environmental Governance  
 
This literature review will define ‘green grabbing,’ neoliberalism and governance. It 
will also explain the shift from state-run governance to non-state, market-driven governance. 
Eco-label certification has become an important instrument of global governance. Global 
environmental governance is a field that includes the institutions, processes, initiatives, 
actors, and organizations that shape environmental actions and outcomes in the global realm 
(O’Neil et al. 2013). This field is a departure from the traditional state-centered view of 
governance. While the literature in political science, international relations, economics and 
law has widened to include studies towards broader understandings of governance, there has 
been a great amount of theoretical discussion about what governance means. This research 
builds on the emerging critique of what is referred to as ‘neoliberal’ or market-oriented 
governance (Foley and Herbert 2013; Guldbrandsen 2010), or more recently ‘green grabbing’ 
(Corson, MacDonald and Neimark 2013; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012).  
The term ‘green grabbing’ refers both to the history of state “appropriation of land 
and resources for environmental ends” (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012, 237) and how 
state institutions are aligning with market logics to create and commodify new natures 
through new forms of environmental conservation. The green grab metaphor is used to 
illustrate how market logics have become dominant in the field of environmental governance 
and conservation, displacing a previous logic based on the idea that a Keynesian state should 
act to protect the environment (Corson, MacDonald and Neimark 2013, 7). New research in 
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this area analyzes four case studies of sustainability certification1 in seafood to show that 
‘green grabbing’ is not necessarily the central dynamic in assembling sustainability 
territories, and that certification always involves state agencies in determining how the key 
elements that comprise it are defined (Vandergeest, Ponte and Simon 2015). While not the 
central dynamic, elements of a green grab are embedded in complex territorialization 
processes. This study also found some state agencies to be suspicious of sustainability 
certification, while others embrace it or use it to extend their sovereignty. Vandergeest, Ponte 
and Simon (2015) argued that the relationship between state action, market logics and 
territorialization in environmental governance bears closer examination. In agreement with 
their argument, these same concepts will be further investigated.   
Kolben (2011) defines governance as “a process in which regulatory authority and 
legitimacy have become de-centered from the state and from government.” Alternatively, 
Cadman (2011) finds governance to be “portrayed as essentially social-political in nature, 
and understood as ongoing processes of interaction between social groups and forces within 
public and private institutions. Interaction is key, and is identified as a series of co-
arrangements between state and non-state actors, more oriented towards collaborative 
approaches to problem-solving based on the formation of criteria, or the setting of 
standards.” Both these definitions highlight that governance includes a broad range of actors 
from both the public and private sectors. According to Cadman’s definition, governance is 
the interaction between a range of actors who work through processes and institutions to 
channel ideas and power to reach a particularly desirable outcome.  
																																								 																				
1	Certified sustainable shrimp farming in Thailand, certified organic shrimp farming in Vietnam, MSC 
certification of hake in South Africa and MSC certification of skipjack tuna in the Western Pacific.  
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The non-state, private or “co-arrangements,” where both state and non-state actors 
collaborate to meet desired objectives mentioned in these definitions of governance include a 
wide range of organizations, arrangements, or institutions that are described in the literature 
using many different terms including “voluntary codes /initiatives,” “soft law,” and “civil 
regulation.” These can all be categorized as being part of a school of governance, referred to 
as “new governance.” Kolben (2011) describes this new governance as encompassing: 
New processes emerging which range from informal consultation in highly 
formalized systems that seek to affect behavior but differ in many ways from 
traditional command and control regulation. These processes may encourage 
experimentation; employ stakeholder participation to devise solutions; rely on broad 
framework agreements, flexible norms and revisable standards; and use benchmarks, 
indicators and peer review to ensure accountability (422).  
 
Within the new governance literature, “soft law” studies focus on mechanism and standards 
that are not legally enforceable by the state. Kirton and Trebilock (2004) define soft law as:  
Voluntary standards that serve as equivalents to legislation, government law, and 
regulation and the informal institutions at the international, transnational, and national 
levels that depend on voluntary supplied participation, resources and consensual 
actions of their members.  
 
These instruments exist parallel with traditional governmental command and control 
regulations that set legally enforceable requirements for compliance. In the case of soft law, 
voluntary standards include everything from standards and certification to voluntary 
corporate codes of conduct.  The new governance literature addresses the neoliberal shift 
from state-led regulation to non-state governance, which is known as market-driven 
governance. 
Neoliberalism is a political economic theory centered on individual rights, free 
markets, trade and private property. Its proponents argue that the good of society can be 
maximized through individuals maximizing their self-interest, which is best achieved through 
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the market. Neoliberal policy has resulted in a reduction and discrediting of social welfare 
programs and Keynesian policies, what Peck and Tickell (2002) term rollback neoliberalism. 
Characterized by privatization, deregulation and liberalization, rollback neoliberalism has 
resulted in states being less willing and capable of orchestrating environmental regulation 
(Bartley 2003). In many countries, including the United States, Peck and Tickell (2002) 
argue neoliberalization has entered a second stage, what they term rollout neoliberalism. This 
has resulted in a re-regulation of the economy, with rollout neoliberalism shifting from state-
led regulation to non-state, market-driven governance (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004). 
This shift is characterized by an increasing combination of corporations, industry 
associations, social movement organizations and certification bodies being responsible for 
developing and enforcing regulations (Bartley 2007, Konefal 2012). Environmental 
regulation is thus left to private actors, or as a joint public-private undertaking, and relies on 
market-based mechanisms, such as third-party certification, to gain credibility and to be 
legitimate (Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004).  
The literature on “private regulatory regimes,” “private governance,” “civil 
regulation,” and “voluntary codes/initiatives” focuses on the tools covered by these 
categorizations, including standards and certification schemes, company ethics statements, 
corporate codes of conduct, management systems, and other non-governmental organization 
led instruments such as the Global Reporting Initiative (Gordon 1999). These scholars find 
that the defining features of these instruments is that they do not necessarily rely on the state 
for their legitimization, nor are they necessarily legislated by the state. Instead, they lie in the 
private or voluntary spheres where they are either created by a single entity (i.e. NGO, 
company, industry association, etc.) or in a multi-stakeholder setting that may include the 
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state looking to address social and environmental problems (Ha 2012). The Forest 
Stewardship Council’s (FSC) certification and labelling organization is an example of a path-
breaking market mechanism of global environmental governance in the post-1992 Rio Earth 
Summit era of liberal environmentalism. Cashore (2002, 512) conceptualized the FSC as 
‘non-state market-driven governance’ because the ‘location of authority is grounded in 
market transactions occurring through the production, processing, and consumption of 
economic goods and services.’ Voluntary eco-labeling as a standard and certification scheme 
is an important tool in this new form of global environmental governance.  
The emergence and proliferation of certification as a global governance tool has been 
well documented (Conroy 2007; Elliot 2000; Foley 2011; Gulbrandsen 2010). The 
assessment of the legitimacy of these certification systems has received special attention 
(Aichlmayer 2010; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Koppell 2010). Most studies focus on 
questions of legitimacy. These studies have analyzed through specific cases how rules are 
made in certification systems and who can participate in the rule making. Examples of case 
studies include: the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; 
Dingwerth 2007), Marine Stewardship Council (Ponte 2006) or a number of cases (Koppel 
2010). 
 Eco-labels have also become an important illustration of the powerful expectations 
surrounding disciplinary neoliberalism, defined as a concrete form of structural and 
behavioral power that operates with different degrees of intensity across a range of "public" 
and "private" spheres (Foley 2011). Broadly speaking, legitimacy is the processes through 
which objects, process and practices gain credibility (Weber 1978). Neoliberalism requires 
continual legitimization because it “is a socially produced, historically and geographically 
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specific, crisis-driven, conjunctural, and definitionally incomplete phenomenon” (Peck and 
Tickell 2007). Legitimacy is necessary for any authority system, whether it be based on 
neoliberalism or something else. This means that for an eco-certification scheme, and 
corresponding eco-label, to be deemed legitimate, neoliberalization needs to be viewed as 
credible, valid and appropriate by not only relevant groups, but consumers as well (Konefal 
2012). How legitimacy is established for voluntary eco-certifications is an important aspect 
of any labelling scheme. The frameworks of eco-label certification that have been developed 
to analyze the legitimacy of eco-certification systems will now be reviewed. 
Legitimacy of Eco-label Certification Systems 
 
Eco-labelling based on third-party certification assessment developed out of concerns 
about resource depletion and insufficient governmental action in the early 1990s. An “eco-
label” is a label that provides information in a standardized manner, reflecting the result of a 
life cycle analysis and the environmental characteristics of the product, to allow the 
consumer to make a more informed purchase (LeBlanc 2003). A globalized market tool, eco-
labels are used to address collective action problems through consumer choices. They have 
become one of the most widely and enthusiastically promoted strategies of individualist and 
consumerist responses to environmental regulation (Gulbrandsen 2005). The first eco-label 
was dolphin friendly tuna (labeled dolphin safe) by the United States Department of 
Commerce in 1990. This new environmental labelling concept was viewed as a less intrusive 
policy instrument, compared to regulations and market based initiatives (Cooper, Ludlow and 
Clift 2012).  
Most eco-labeling programs have been developed by non-governmental organizations 
(NGO), however some eco-labelling programs have been developed by the industries 
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themselves. An organization or entity creates an eco-label conformance criteria. The 
organization is the owner of criteria. Independent certifiers are approved by the organization 
to carry out sustainability assessments against the eco-label conformance criteria. 
Independent certifiers are generally natural resource consulting firms that specialize in 
environmental impact assessments. The FAO Committee on Fisheries (2014) identified 26 
major eco-labels, retail labels and consumer guides for fisheries and fishery products alone. 
The MSC was the first global multi-criteria certification and labeling scheme for fisheries, 
establishing principles and criteria for its definition of “well-managed fisheries.” These 
principles and criteria include the maintenance of the productivity and diversity of the 
ecosystem on which the fishery depends. They also include prescriptions to stop overfishing 
and are respectful of local, national and international sustainability fishery laws and 
standards (Agnew et al. 2013).  
The MSC criteria and principles are based on the 1995 Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries that was adopted by the FAO. Modeled after the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), the MSC was established in 1996 by the World Wildlife for Nature Fund and 
the Unilever food conglomerate, as a market based labeling scheme for fisheries. The idea 
behind the MSC label is that consumers may support sustainable management practices by 
buying products carrying a label indicating that they are sourced from well-managed 
resources (Gulbrandsen 2005). Like the FSC, the MSC label requires chain of custody 
tracking to ensure that products carrying its logo actually originate in a sustainable fishery. 
Certification systems are voluntary regulatory systems in which transnational 
networks of diverse actors set and enforce standards. Sustainability certification can be 
understood as a set of interlinked governance practices which includes at least: setting 
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standards for ecological and social interactions, auditing compliance with these standards, 
assigning labels or logos to products and enterprises which meet the standards and creating 
institutions to implement these activities (Mutersbaugh et al. 2005). Three standards exist for 
eco-labeling: first, second and third party (Ramachandran 2010; Weber 2002; Wessells et al. 
2001). Weber (2002) provides a summary of the standards commonly associated with the 
dissemination of environmental information or product claims and the barriers that standards 
can evoke. First-party standards are developed by a company for application within the 
company. This form of eco-labeling can be referred to as “self-declaration” (Gardiner and 
Viswanathan 2004).  Second-party labeling standards are developed by an industry 
organization to apply to the entire industry sector. Third-party standards are developed by 
organizations independent of the industry to which the standards apply. For example, a third-
party uses a certification procedure to provide written assurance that a product, process or 
service is in conformity with the standards. Although third-party standards are often 
preferred in the transfer of environmental information to consumers, the true objectivity of 
these standards is dependent on the range of input provided during the standards 
development (Phillips, Ward and Chaffee 2003).  
Eco-label standards focus on environmental and social issues based on notions of 
sustainability. These systems are distinct in that they are private and voluntary systems that 
use the market to provide public goods, with their aim not solely to govern the behavior of 
the parties involved, but also to address the areas that states fail to govern (Meidinger 2003).  
Often relying on democratic theory, several researchers have developed frameworks to 
analyze the legitimacy of certification systems, by analyzing specific case studies and placing 
strong emphasis on institutional design (Dingwerth 2007; Koppell 2010; Ostrom 2005).  
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Most of these studies focus on the decision-making procedures and policy strategies within a 
certification system and the standard setting process in particular (Marx 2013). Bernstein and 
Cashore (2007) built upon these theoretical foundations and developed a three-phase model 
on how certification systems gain legitimacy. They state that:  
Legitimacy requires institutionalized authority (whether concentrated or diffuse) with 
power resources to exercise rule as well as shared norms among the community. 
Norms of legitimacy provide justifications and a shared understanding of what an 
acceptable or appropriate institution should look like and bounds what it can and 
should do (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 351). 
 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007) argue that certification systems gain political 
legitimacy through successful “community building” (362). Stakeholder involvement in the 
decision making procedures is important. When stakeholders come to a consensus, the 
certification system is recognized as legitimate and the deliberation process helps different 
actors to develop shard norms of legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 363). Following 
this line of research, attention has gone towards investigating how decisions in certification 
systems are made, who has access to the decision making procedures, and who is represented 
in the decision making process.  
Several authors have argued that a standard-setting process for verification and 
review can be open and transparent, but that the procedures to assess conformity with the 
rules can differ, thereby affecting the legitimacy of the system (Aichlmayer 2010; Elliot 
2000; Weber 2002). Weber (2002) found that the preferred method of developing standards 
that maintain true objectivity and independence is to include a wide range of stakeholders. 
Without a wide range of stakeholder input, third-party standards can become as biased as any 
other standard. Aichlmayer (2010) contends that a credible (legitimate) eco-label is one that 
“addresses multiple environmental issues across a product’s entire lifecycle.” To measure the 
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effectiveness of any eco-labeling standard, criteria have been developed to judge the 
effectiveness of certification standards (Elliot 2000 and MRAG 2010). Elliot (2000) 
developed a set of criteria to assess certification standards from a review of the common 
requirements given for such standards in the literature. Elliot lists 14 criteria, which include: 
credible to consumers, comprehensive, objective and measurable, reliable, independent from 
parties with vested interests, voluntary in participation, equitable in treatment, acceptable to 
the involved parties, institutionally adapted to the local conditions, cost effective, transparent, 
goal-oriented and effective in reaching objectives, practical and operational, and applicable 
to all scales of operation. Gardiner and Viswanathan (2004) found that Elliot’s standard 
provides the most relevant precedent for eco-labeling in fisheries since labeling and 
certification of fisheries is relatively recent compared to forest products. MRAG (2010) 
outline seven main criteria that any eco-labeling standards must address.  These are scope, 
accuracy, independence, precision, transparency, standardization and cost-effectiveness.  
Auld and Gulbrandsen (2010) completed an extensive investigation of transparency 
and accountability of certification systems, distinguishing between two forms of 
transparency: procedural transparency and outcome transparency. Procedural transparency 
refers to openness of the decision making process, while outcome transparency refers to the 
openness of the outcome of the certification process and the context of accountability where 
stakeholders use disclosed information to hold actors accountable for their commitments. 
This component of legitimacy is often operationalized through institutional design, in the 
form of complaint, appeal or dispute settlement mechanisms (Ostrom 2005).  
Marx (2013) proposes a configurational approach to assessing the legitimacy of eco-
labels. This approach assessed 426 eco-labels on three components related to legitimacy. 
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First, the decision making procedures of certification systems were assessed. Then the design 
of the verification system was analyzed. The final factor investigated was the presence and 
functionality of the dispute settlement mechanism. His paper elaborates upon each 
component and conducted an empirical assessment of the presence of each component using 
the Eco-label Index database. Containing more than 400 eco-labels operating worldwide 
from different economic sectors, the Eco-label Index is the most exhaustive database on eco-
labels available. Using an analysis technique developed by Ragin (1987, 2008), which is well 
suited for analyzing configurations of parameters. He used a truth table to rewrite 
certification systems as a configuration of parameters that are either present or absent in a 
certification system for seven parameters under the three components. Key findings from the 
study reveal that for recertification of an eco-label, data is available for 216 labels. Of those 
cases, only 25 percent use third-party for reassessment.  Furthermore, 45 eco-labels make 
their audits publically available, and about 150 eco-labels make use of the corrective action 
plans. These results indicate that the granting of many eco-labels is rather flexible. 
Eco-labels have become one of the most widely and enthusiastically promoted 
strategies of individualist, consumerist responses to environmental regulation and an 
important illustration of the powerful expectations surrounding disciplinary neoliberalism 
(Foley 2011). Integrating Durkheimian and Foucauldian notions of discipline, Gill coined the 
concept of disciplinary neoliberalism to refer to a ‘concrete form of structural and behavioral 
power.’ Neoliberal forms of discipline are not necessarily universal nor consistent, but they 
are bureaucratized and institutionalized, and they operate with different degrees of intensity 
across a range of "public" and "private" spheres (Gill 1995). The disciplinary neoliberalism 
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concept can be used to understand the emergence of the concept of 'sustainable 
development,’ as well as assumptions made about consumption,  
“Sustainable development must be made compatible with maintaining buyer 
confidence and creating a stable or profitable business environment, premised on the 
assumption that investors and buyers, including the often more affluent consumers of 
seafood, are a privileged group who will act in the interest of the public good” (Foley 
2011).  
 
Although seldom distinguished in the literature, Foley (2011) identifies two important market 
mechanisms associated with disciplinary discourses on eco-labels. He asserts eco-labels are 
assumed to generate both a ratcheting up of market-wide environmental performance and 
legitimacy (that market-incentives can 'ratchet up' improvements towards more sustainable 
products and practices through consumer power). This thesis applies Gill’s disciplinary 
neoliberalism to test whether the Alaska processors move from the MSC to ASMI’s RFM 
Certification resulted in the new territorial eco-label generating the opposite of the assumed, 
a ratcheting down of market-wide environmental performance and legitimacy. To further 
understand Alaska’s development of an alternative sustainability certification, similar place-
based eco-label schemes utilized by Iceland and Japan will be reviewed alongside the Alaska 
case. 
Territorial Eco-Certification in Fisheries 
The rise of eco-certifications tied to particular national and sub-national territories in 
fisheries provides insights into the dynamic global politics of eco-certification, particularly 
the nature of power, dominance, alternatives and resistance that exists within each case 
(Foley and Havice 2016). Alaska, Iceland and Japan are examples of states that have moved 
away from the MSC and created independent place-specific, or “territorial” eco-labeling 
certification programs.  
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These new territorial labelling schemes rely on a global authoritative institutional 
framework provided by the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Management 
and Eco-Labeling Guidelines to build credibility for their eco-labels. While the MSC has 
been widely studied, (Gutierrez et al. 2012; Parkes et al. 2010; Ponte 2006), these alternative 
labeling schemes that have emerged, sometimes in conflict with the MSC, are understudied. 
These new eco-certification initiatives develop a mechanism for industry and states to 
demonstrate that existing regulatory institutions and production practices that are 
geographically bounded, provide an environmentally legitimate option and are worthy of 
international recognition (Foley and Havice 2016). They also provide an alternative by 
integrating transnational governance norms within a geographical eco-certification that 
allows the territorial certification scheme to compete with, and offer an alternative to the 
MSC. Industry has driven the development of each territorial eco-certification, often through 
nationally embedded industry associations and various forms of government partnership. 
Foley and Havice (2016) found the prime catalyst and significant motivation for all five of 
the cases they studied was developing an alternative to the MSC.  
Foley and Havice (2016) identified these new fisheries eco-certifications as emerging 
forms of what might be conceptualized as territorial sustainability governance. The five 
territorial eco-certification initiatives in the fisheries sector examined were located in Japan 
(the Marine Eco-Label – MEL), Iceland (the Iceland Responsible Fisheries eco-label – IRF), 
Alaska (the Alaska Responsible Fisheries Management Certification Program), Canada (a 
pilot project), and the US (an in-process proposal). Their analysis revealed four closely 
related motivations that develop the territoriality as spatial strategy: (1) to respond 
strategically to the MSC, (2) to respond strategically to the transnational sustainable seafood 
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movement, (3) to reassert and demonstrate territorial control over national fisheries, and (4) 
to enhance control over information and communication of territorially-specific regulatory 
and production practices, manifested as a territorialized brand of eco-certification. This 
research and analysis will focus on established certification programs in Alaska, Iceland and 
Japan. 
The Alaska RFM Certification program was led by ASMI, a public-private agency 
created under state law as a public corporation to serve as the state’s seafood marketing arm 
representing both fishing and processing interests. Alaska’s certification programs utilizes 
Global Trust as an independent certification body. Global Trust is a privately owned 
company that is an accredited certification body with operational projects in over twenty-five 
countries. Founded in 1998 and with global headquarters in Ireland, Global Trust is not a 
standards owner, nor is the logo a specific eco-label. Instead, Global Trust is an ISO 
accredited independent certification body delivering certification to standards.  This assists 
many standards owners with accreditation and certification criteria for standards. Global 
Trust also carries out sustainability assessments against eco-label conformance criteria. This 
is essentially the same role as natural resource consulting firms that specialize in 
environmental impact assessments. What is confusing is that ASMI and Global Trust crafted 
a convoluted market mechanism. The original version took the State of Alaska salmon 
management policy and compared this to principles of the FAO guidelines and UN Fisheries 
guidelines. Global Trust certified that Alaska had responsible fishery management, without 
ever carrying out a stock assessment. ASMI has since changed this, and now has their own 
‘RFM Fisheries Standard.’ 
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In the Alaska case, frustrations with the costs of the MSC eco-certification and eco-
label licensing fees were stated as the primary motivation in creating an alternative. ASMI 
wished to maintain Alaska stakeholder control of messaging, and to communicate what it 
perceived to be a historic well established reputation of sustainability of Alaska’s fisheries 
(Foley and Herbert 2013). MSC’s powerful influence over market access also motivated 
actors to develop alternatives, as monopoly in the market place was explicitly cited in Alaska 
(Foley and Herbert 2013) and Iceland (Bjarnason 2007).  
Iceland’s Responsible Fisheries (IRF) eco-label is the only other fishery in the world 
to utilize Global Trust as an independent certification body. They have done so since the 
launching of the IRF in 2007, and have never been certified by the MSC. The program was 
developed by the Fisheries Association of Iceland, which consisted of the Federation of 
Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners, the National Association of Small Board Owners, and the 
Federation of Icelandic Fishing Processing Plants. In Iceland, processors sought to avoid 
expensive verification processes through its program (Bjarnason 2007). Icelandic fisheries 
interests were also concerned about international environmental NGOs influence on tense 
whaling debates and the influence this controversy could have on major domestic fisheries 
such as cod (Foley and Havice 2016). Kvalvik, Noestvold and Young (2014) investigated 
why Norway went with the MSC, while Iceland created their own sustainability program. 
Their research found that the different strategies are due to differences in the industries 
market positions, their response to advocacy groups, reputational considerations and the 
structure of the industry in Norway and Iceland. In addition, they found differences in the 
role of the fishery in public policy and national discourses. Control over fisheries is a 
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powerful force in Icelandic identity and culture, with pride of their seafood industry 
providing strong weight for resisting the MSC (Foley and Havice 2016).  
Japan maintains their own alternative labelling scheme for evaluating the 
sustainability of fishery resources. The program is called Marine Eco-label (MEL) Japan. 
Japan Fisheries Association, a public interest corporation, developed the standardizing 
processes for MEL Japan. A major motivation for a territorial initiative was to offer a 
framework in which large and small scale fisherman could obtain eco-certification rapidly 
and a low cost; in addition, MEL Japan was created to provide a counter point to the 
publicized and generalized accounts of fisheries decline (Moye 2010). MEL Japan also 
became a platform in the defense of whaling. Though MEL Japan is not actively attempting 
to certify whaling, the organization took up this issue as part of its national and cultural 
mission (Foley and Havice 2016). Similar to the Icelandic case, Japanese interests were 
opposed to NGO influence on whaling issues affecting other major domestic fisheries.  
Moye’s (2010) MEL Japan findings can be applied to Alaska and Iceland’s industry 
operated eco-labels because in both cases there is a clear conflict of interest between 
economics and an environmental mandate.  While the mission of the MSC is to safeguard 
ocean resources, ASMI’s mission as a marketing organization is to increase the economic 
value of the Alaska seafood resource. In her evaluation of MEL Japan, Moye (2010) 
proposes that private programs such as the MSC are better suited to run eco-labeling 
programs than state-run entities. Private entities (such as the MSC) lack many of the 
pressures faced by state run programs, where government and industry have a strong interest 
in the success of the fishing industry.  
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Iceland, Japan and Alaska all wanted to be independent from the MSC to maintain 
their own interests and identity. They also wanted a cheaper eco-certification. The desire to 
protect domestic fisheries interests and the cultural importance of whaling is shared by Japan 
and Iceland. Alaska believed their state fishery management was reputable enough to market 
their own resources. This is why the Alaska stakeholders wanted more control of messaging 
and created a State owned eco-label.  In all three cases, relations between powerful seafood 
industry organizations are highly integrated. In addition, state agencies acted together to 
support the interests of the domestic industry, while navigating the global industry (Foley and 
Havice 2016). Each territorial eco-certification initiative is designed to provide a new means 
to credibly verify, document and communicate sustainability practices. While the established 
programs are technically not self-certification by the state or industry, the dominant trend 
across the cases is to build infrastructures of credibility that are recognized transnationally 
with opportunity for territorial features (Foley and Havice 2016). Territorial eco-
certification’s challenge of the MSC certification is an example of the dynamic and political 
nature of environmental governance in the global economy. 
Placing the case study of Alaskan salmon into context, the description of events 
begins with a detailed overview of salmon management in Alaska from statehood to present. 
The MSC Certification of Alaska salmon will then be described. This is followed by a 
detailed account of the politics of four MSC client transfers from 2008-2011. A comparative 
analysis of the MSC and ASMI’s RFM Certification reveals the differences of the two eco-
labelling programs. The final section of the Alaska salmon case study is of the politics of 
four MSC client transfers from 2012-2015.  
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The Alaska Salmon Fishery Case Study 
Since statehood, political struggles over control and management of salmon fisheries 
have been a defining feature of Alaska’s history and have informed natural resource 
management policies (Foley and Herbert 2013). Fisheries management in the US sometimes 
remained with the federal government, as was the case for US territories. Under federalism, 
states had the power to regulate fisheries within their own jurisdiction. The first Organic Act 
was passed by Congress in 1884 and set up organized territories from newly acquired lands 
giving varying degrees of regulatory authority to manage and control fishery resources to 
new territorial governments (Clark et al. 2006). The only exception was the territory of 
Alaska. The management of the Alaska salmon had been the sole responsibility of the federal 
government from the time Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867 until 1960, one year 
after Alaska achieved statehood. In 1976, with the passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the federal 
government began actively managing its fisheries within the 200 nautical mile exclusive 
economic zone. Prior to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, waters beyond 12 nautical miles were 
international waters and fished by fleets from other countries.  
The Magnuson-Stevens Act is the primary law governing marine fisheries 
management in the US federal waters. Under what came to be know as the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act, the authority to manage fisheries in Alaska, and other jurisdictions is divided 
between the federal government regional fishery management councils, state managers and in 
some cases tribal managers.  State jurisdiction extends to 3 nautical miles. Fisheries beyond 
state jurisdiction and within the US exclusive economic zone are the responsibility of the 
federal government. While there are other levels of government involved in the management 
	25	
of Alaskan salmon, this investigation will focus on state management, in order to understand 
to what extent the State of Alaska’s hatchery management program influenced the MSC 
recertification process and stakeholder’s decision to pursue the new Alaska FAO-based eco-
label.  
Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution is dedicated to natural resources. The Alaska 
Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game conduct salmon 
management within state waters. The Board of Fisheries is a constitutionally created 
regulatory body that is made up of individuals who are knowledgeable about the fishing 
industry. Appointed by the Governor for three-year terms, they vote on regulations that 
govern the states fisheries (Iudicello, Weber and Wieland 1999). The Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game provides research, management and enforcement of regulations. The 
conversion to state management in 1959, in addition to the establishment of the hatchery 
program (salmon enhancement) in 1971 and the introduction of the limited entry permit 
system in 1973 resulted in the State of Alaska being able to increase the salmon population 
fisheries from prior record low levels.  
Alaska’s limited entry permit system was introduced in 1973 and is an example of a 
license limitation combined with limitations on catch and restrictions on units and size of 
gear (Phillips, Ward and Chaffee 2003). The limited entry program succeeded in improving 
management and the ability of the fishery managers to regulate the fishery. This insured that 
harvesting could occur while still meeting the escapement objectives. In addition, the 
program maintained a high proportion of Alaska resident participation in the salmon fisheries 
(Clark et al. 2006).  
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Alaska salmon enhancement was initially conceived as state-run systems. Today 
private non-profit corporations run most hatcheries. Salmon hatcheries improve the catch for 
sport fisherman and commercial fishing operations. However, salmon hatcheries and the 
increased control that is inherent in them create further problems for salmon and society 
(Scarce 2000). In 1995, the total salmon return from Alaska hatchery operations was 
estimated at more than 38 million fish. In 1996, Alaska had collected and incubated 1.7 
billion salmon eggs. This accounted for fry, fingerling and smolt releases to exceed 1.5 
billion per year (Chaffee 2000, 15). In 2011, 31 percent of salmon harvested in Alaska came 
from the hatchery production of hundreds of millions of pink and chum salmon, and smaller 
numbers of sockeye, chinook and coho salmon. The quantity of hatchery salmon to the 
overall Alaska harvest has been gradually on the rise over the past decade. It is problematic 
that Alaska has built up an industry that is heavily reliant on hatchery salmon, when prior to 
2012 virtually nothing was known about the effects hatchery fish were having on wild 
populations (Grant 2012; Naish et al. 2008). 
Effects on the salmon fishery by hatchery programs fall into two broad categories. 
First, returning hatchery fish mixing with natural stocks as they enter fishing areas (Brenner, 
Moffitt and Grant 2012). Hatchery stocks are able to withstand very high exploitation rates 
because their run is terminal and the fish are expected to nearly all be harvested because they 
are artificially replaced every year.  Natural spawning fish cannot tolerate equivalent 
exploitation rates. Achieving a balance between the harvest of mixed hatchery and wild 
stocks can be a difficult task, wherein attempts are made to maximize the hatchery harvest 
while ensuring adequate protection is still provided for naturally spawning stocks.  
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Second, some data suggest the release of large numbers of hatchery juveniles into 
near shore rearing areas may have an effect on the growth and survival of natural stocks 
through competition for food (Rand et al. 2012; Ruggerone, Agler and Nielsen 2012; 
Ruggerone et al. 2010). This negatively affects natural stocks because the increased presence 
of hatchery fish results in less food for them. In addition, straying and spawning of hatchery-
origin fish into natural spawning areas may affect fitness and productivity of wild 
populations (Gardner et al. 2004). The impact of hatchery salmon on wild stocks is a serious 
problem. This research only investigates State level salmon management in Alaska and the 
competing interests between eco-labelling certifications during the recertification of Alaska 
salmon in 2012. However, Japan and Russia are also utilizing industrial salmon hatcheries in 
the North Pacific. Studies have been conducted that investigate how hatchery salmon interact 
with wild salmon, and how they influence the carrying capacity of the North Pacific. 
Research is actively continuing in Alaska and throughout the Pacific coast to better 
understand and address these issues (Chaffee 2007).2 
Marine Stewardship Council Certification of Alaska Salmon 
 This section will explain the MSC certification process for Alaska salmon. It will also 
show that sustainability concerns have been an ongoing issue within the fishery since first 
																																								 																				
2 The most extensive study has been underway since 2012 in Prince William Sound and Southeast, 
Alaska by Prince William Sound Science Center in conjunction with Sitka Sound Science Center, 
scheduled to be concluded in 2016. The project titled “Interactions of wild and hatchery pink and 
chum salmon in Prince William Sound and Southeast Alaska” intends to answer three important 
questions: 
1. What is the genetic stock structure of pink and chum salmon in each region? 
2. What is the extent and annual variability in straying of hatchery pink salmon in PWS and 
chum salmon in PWS and SEAK? 
3. What is the impact on fitness (productivity) of wild pink and chum salmon stocks due to 
straying of hatchery pink and chum salmon? 
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entering into certification. The move from certifying the fishery as a whole, to dividing 
Alaska into smaller units of certification was highly debated, and contributed to the Alaska 
stakeholders departure from the MSC.    
In 1998, MSC officials began discussing certification possibilities for Alaska salmon. 
An agreement was reached between the MSC and ADF&G to assess Alaska’s salmon fishery 
as a test case. Full assessment of a fishery to the MSC standards is a rigorous and public 
process. The process begins when a person or organization client seeks MSC certification for 
a particular fishery resource. The client is the person or organization that has entered into an 
agreement with a conformity assessment body (CAB) and the MSC with the purpose to 
achieve the MSC certification. The CAB provides an independent, objective and 
scientifically verifiable assessment of the resource. A contract with a CAB is signed, and the 
CAB notifies the MSC and other stakeholders that the fishery is entering full assessment.  
One of the most important facets of the MSC assessment process is the involvement 
of stakeholder groups that include: fishermen, environmental groups, recreational fishermen, 
environmental agencies and other levels of the marketing chain (Knapp, Roheim and 
Anderson 2007). A working group consisting of fish harvesters, government managers, 
processors and conservation groups was assembled by the fishery client ADF&G. During the 
initial discussions, there was concern that data gathered during the certification process could 
affect resource allocation because it was possible for the information to be used by one 
region or gear type against another (Phillips, Ward and Chaffee 2003). The MSC agreed to 
the condition of not reporting information that linked problems to any particular region’s 
fishery. They also agreed to pay for the assessment.  
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Stakeholder concerns and environmental issues are a defining feature of MSC’s 
involvement with Alaska salmon. The assessment team was concerned about the lack of 
research on the potential effects of salmon hatcheries on the wild stock gene pool and 
reproductive fitness. The Audubon Society, the Sierra Club of British Columbia and the 
Canadian fishing industry raised concerns, a few of which included: the influence of salmon 
hatcheries on the genetic integrity of wild salmon stocks, the ecological ramifications of 
adding thousands of additional salmon fry into the ocean and their effect through competition 
for the plankton food source (Knapp, Roheim and Anderson 2007). They also questioned the 
adequacy of marking hatchery salmon to understand their influence in Prince William Sound 
and other areas. 
 Even though sustainability concerns had surfaced from the assessment, the Alaska 
salmon fishery was MSC certified for the first time in 2000. ‘Conditions’ for continued 
certification were placed on the fishery. In order to remain certified, the ADF&G would have 
to comply and show progress towards resolving the conditions with documentation of the 
programs, policies, regulations, statutes and specific actions taken to assure the consistency 
of the hatchery program with the Genetics Policy (Chaffee 2000).   An important condition 
was that the ADF&G must identify long range research needed to assess the magnitude of the 
interaction of hatchery programs on the wild stock gene pool and the effect on the 
reproductive fitness of those stocks (Duffy 2005).  
The MSC certificate is valid for five years. During this time, the accredited 
conformity assessment body conducts an annual surveillance audit to verify continued 
compliance. As one of the first fisheries to receive the MSC certification, it was one of the 
first to enter the full reassessment process in 2005. The reassessment of the Alaska salmon 
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fishery proceeded differently than the initial assessment. Rather than assessing the fishery as 
a single fishery for all rivers, gear types and all species, it was assessed with 16 units of 
certification. These units of certification are generally defined by geographical area, each 
containing various species and usually more than one gear type. These 16 units represent the 
5 species of salmon and more than 400 salmon stocks spread over the state of Alaska.  
Hatcheries continued to be an issue throughout the annual surveillance audits and the 
reassessment process. In particular, the surveillance audit recommended that “a reassessment 
should examine what recent genetic and population research is being conducted to ascertain 
the ongoing effects of hatchery releases” (Scientific Certification Systems 2004). Despite the 
concern over hatcheries, Alaska salmon was recertified in 2007. The certificate was valid 
until 2012. The final assessment report listed 69 conditions for continued certification. An 
analysis of the 2007 conditions found that 17 were related to hatchery activities (25 percent).3 
Key conditions are footnoted, while the full list of the 17 conditions relating to hatcheries can 
be found in the appendix.  
The Politics of MSC Client Transfers: Part 1, from 2008 to 2011 
Following the completion of the first annual audit in 2008, the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game (ADF&G) announced that they would no longer remain the client for the 
																																								 																				
3	Key Conditions include: Condition 3- Estimate contribution of hatchery chum to wild escapement in 
representative areas through appropriate means, such as implementing thermal otolith mass marking of all 
hatchery chum salmon [Southeast]. Condition 23- Provide adequate data and analyses to demonstrate that 
hatchery and fishery management actions are sufficient to ensure that harvest of enhanced fish is not adversely 
affecting the wild pink, chum, sockeye, and coho stocks. Revise wild stock assessments and management as 
appropriate [Prince William Sound]. Condition 66- Establish and implement a mechanism for periodic formal 
evaluations of each hatchery program for consistency with statewide policies and prescribed management 
practices. This would include a specific evaluation of each program relative to related policies and management 
practices [All].  
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MSC certified Alaska salmon and planned to transfer the client role to the Alaska Seafood 
Marketing Institute (ASMI), the state of Alaska’s public-private seafood marketing group. In 
fall of 2009, ASMI and the MSC debated issues of concern to ASMI before assuming the 
new client role. In a letter sent from ASMI to the MSC, ASMI insisted that client sponsorship 
be cost neutral and that the processors expected to benefit from the use of the MSC eco-label 
cover ASMI’s administrative costs. ASMI did not want to be the client to MSC unless it was 
cost neutral because they planned to use their state funding to launch their own eco-label 
program.  
Unable to reach a compromise between the MSC and the processors on the cost 
issues, ASMI voted to delay its decision to take on the role of client for the Alaska salmon 
fishery’s MSC certification. In February 2010, it was announced that the Alaska Fisheries 
Development Foundation (AFDF) would serve as the new client. AFDF began to work on the 
annual audit and to address the remaining conditions of certification. As a result of the 
change of client, the annual surveillance audit and second full reassessment were delayed. 
AFDF contracted with Moody Marine International to conduct a new assessment necessary 
to recertify the fishery (Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation 2012). The current 
certification was set to expire in October 2012.  
Around the same time that AFDF assumed the client role, the ASMI board of 
directors announced that it had contracted with Global Trust Certification to assess and 
certify the management of Alaska fisheries in accordance with the FAO’s Code of 
Responsible Fisheries, and the FAO Guidelines for Eco-labeling of Fish and Fishery 
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Products from Marine Wild Capture Fisheries.4 Alaska stakeholders, specifically the 
processors and state entities, became frustrated with three core elements of the MSC 
certification program: fisheries certification costs, chain-of-custody and related eco-label 
fees, and eco-label marketing (Foley and Herbert 2013). The 2007 reassessment was 
estimated to have cost $150,000 (Forillo 2009).  Mandatory annual audits were estimated to 
cost $75,000 and $100,000 annually, potentially totaling $650,000 through 2012 (Forillo 
2009).  
From interviews conducted in 2011, Foley and Herbert (2013) found industry insiders 
griping that the MSC demanded eco-label royalty fees at each level of sale. Individual 
companies using the trademarked MSC logo on product packaging continued to pay the MSC 
eco-label licensing fees based on the volume of MSC product they sold. This helps explain 
why so much certified Alaska salmon was sold to consumers without the MSC eco-label. For 
example, by 2007 only about 5% of Alaska salmon sold in the US was stamped with the 
MSC’s eco-label (Knapp, Roheim and Anderson 2007). An additional complaint came from 
the ADF&G, with officials reportedly viewing the reassessment process and annual auditing 
requirement to be time consuming. They also felt the work was redundant, since they were 
required to compile detailed accounts of activities they would be doing irrespective of their 
involvement with the MSC program. 
ASMI’s director suggested that buyers were satisfied with Alaska’s historic 
reputation of sustainability, with or without MSC certification. He also insisted that the new 
initiative maintained third-party independence and international credibility. Privately there 
was some dissent to these claims. Foley and Herbert (2013) found through their interviews 
																																								 																				
4	It is important to note that the FAO does not operate a certification or eco-labelling program, accredit 
certification organizations, nor authorize or inspect the use of its principles or guidelines.		
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that an industry insider with a hand in multiple stakeholder groups voiced that the fishery 
was trading an “A+” for a “C+” certification program. Regarding the credibility of Alaska’s 
new label, the Environmental Law Institute (ELI 2012) found that Alaska’s reliance on only 
the FAO Guidelines was not a credible backing on which to base eco-labeling standards and 
legitimacy. In another analysis comparing the MSC and Global Trust’s independent third-
party certified fisheries, The James Sullivan Consulting (2012) found that Alaska and 
Iceland’s eco-labels lacked transparency in standards due to limited publically available 
information regarding standards and stakeholder resolution. To better understand the 
differences between the MSC and RFM certification, an analysis comparing these two 
labelling schemes follows. 
Comparative Analysis of the MSC and RFM Certification  
 This section will compare the MSC certification to ASMI’s FAO-based RFM 
certification that was initially certified by Global Trust. When the RFM program was first 
launched in 2011, the credibility of the scheme was placed on the third-party independent 
assessment entity Global Trust. ASMI has since accepted ownership for the label, and Global 
Trust is now one of the independent assessment bodies that conducts fishery assessments to 
the RFM Fisheries Standard.  ASMI’s RFM program is currently undergoing review to 
improve weaknesses in its program.  
 The MSC Fisheries Standard was designed to assess if a fishery is well managed and 
sustainable. Developed in consultation with scientists, industry, and conservation groups, the 
standard reflects the most up to date understanding of internationally accepted fisheries 
science and best practice management. MSC’s Fisheries Assessment Methodology (FAM) 
provides operational guidance and is the organizations environmental standard for 
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sustainable fishing. The FAM was developed in consultation with fishery stakeholders over a 
2 year period. Version 1 of the FAM was released in July 2008.  
The MSC and RFM conformance criteria both reference FAO Guidelines, but they 
utilize them differently.  For example, the MSC certification is directed by three core 
principles: 
MSC Principle 1: A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-
fishing or depletion of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are 
depleted, the fishery must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their 
recovery.  
MSC Principle 2: Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the 
structure, productivity, function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and 
associated dependent and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends.  
MSC Principle 3: The fishery is subject to an effective management system that 
respects local, national and international laws and standards and incorporates 
institutional and operational frameworks that require use of the resource to be 
responsible and sustainable. 
To determine if each principle is met, the MSC Fisheries Standard comprises 28 performance 
indicators. They are used by independent conformity assessment bodies to score the fishery. 
These core principles lay the foundation for the MSC Guidelines, which are different from 
the FAO Guidelines.  The Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute’s (ASMI) “FAO-based 
Responsible Fisheries Management (RFM) certification,” model assesses fisheries against the 
Conformance Criteria that Global Trust derived from the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and the FAO Guidelines (Global Trust 2012).  
Global Trust developed Alaska’s RFM certification program in 2011. The program is 
accredited by the certification body Global Trust Certification, and is based on the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Management and Eco-Labeling Guidelines. RFM 
certification utilizes the territorial brand identity of ‘Alaska Seafood.’ The 
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2011‘Conformance Criteria’ for the RFM Certification is a 35 page document divided into 
six key components for responsible fisheries management. These sections are then divided 
into 14 fundamental clauses, each made up of its supporting criteria. The six key components 
of the RFM certification program are: the fisheries management system, science and stock 
assessment activities, the precautionary approach, management measures, implementation, 
monitoring and control, and serious impacts of the fishery on the ecosystem.  
It should be noted that the assessment reports for the FAO-based RFM program, 
certified by Global Trust and the MSC recertification refer to hatchery activities differently. 
Global Trust reports primarily refers to hatchery activities as “ocean ranching,” while the 
reports for the MSC use “enhancement.”  This difference in terminology that corresponds to 
the exact same topic adds confusion to the underlying issue present within the Alaska salmon 
fishery. This is important to because it makes this case study more difficult to document and 
understand because of the inconsistent terminology within the literature. Salmon 
enhancement and ocean ranching both refer to the artificial propagation of salmon, where the 
fish is born in a hatchery and then released to the ocean to grow, until returning as a mature 
salmon to be harvested in a terminal fishing area. This is different from salmon farming, 
which is salmon that are raised and harvested from a closed pen in the ocean (Heen, 
Monahan and Utter 2003; Young and Matthews 2010), 
While Foley and Herbert (2013) tracked the controversies surrounding the MSC 
recertification and the development of an alternative certification in Alaska, their analysis of 
Alaska’s alternative FAO-based labelling scheme lacked a detailed investigation into the 
governance structure and legitimacy of the label itself. Three reviews on ASMI’s FAO-based 
RFM certification are available in the literature. James Sullivan Consulting (2012) for the 
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World Wildlife Fund for Nature, the ELI (2012), regarding the credibility of seafood 
certification based on FAO guidelines Code of Conduct, and Fish First Consulting (Taylor 
2013), which outline components of an effective and credible eco-certification. These three 
investigations into the development and credibility of ASMI’s RFM certification, will now 
be presented and analyzed.  
In James Sullivan Consulting’s (2012) update to the comparison of wild capture 
fisheries schemes, the report evaluated and quantified ASMI’s utilization of the FAO-Based 
RFM Certification within eight categories. Their analysis found very little information 
publically available for nearly all the criteria, including: Alaska RFM Certification standard 
setting structures and procedures, accreditation and certification structures, how fishery 
certifiers are expected to operationalize, and how scores are assigned for different ecological 
requirements. In addition, very little public information was available how fishery certifiers 
are expected to operationalize and assign scores to different ecological and validation 
criteria. They also found that the FAO guidelines are referenced in some instances as if they 
are the standard, even though the standards were written by an FAO committee using its own 
process that does not conform to ISO, WTO, or ISEAL Alliance guidelines for standards 
development (James Sullivan Consulting 2012).  
In this report, the MSC was found to be the most in compliance with FAO Guidelines 
from an analysis of eco-labels and benchmarking (Parkes et al. 2010; James Sullivan 
Consulting 2012). MSC scored a 94 percent. ASMI’s RFM certification was found to be 
semi-compliant and received a score of 54 percent. Table 2 provides a summary and 
comparison of the MSC and ASMI’s RFM certification based on findings and data from 
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James Sullivan Consulting (2012) update to the comparison of wild capture fisheries schemes 
report.  
Table 1. Comparison of the MSC and RFM Certification Eco-labeling Schemes  
  
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 








Scheme owner and operator Private: Environmental Private: Industry 
Initiation WWF and Unilever, 1996 ASMI 2010 
Scheme Objectives: what was the 
driving force for the scheme’s 
creation? Why was the eco-label 
created? 
The MSC’s mission is to use its 
eco-label and fishery certification 
program to contribute to the health 
of the world’s oceans by 
recognizing and rewarding 
sustainable fishing practices, 
influencing the choices people make 
when buying seafood, and working 
with partners to transform the 
seafood market to a sustainable 
basis. 
 
Founded on Alaska seafood’s 
reputation of sustainability. The 
certification was created to help to 
further the Alaska origin as a 
leading source of sustainable 
seafood and provide additional 
assurance to buyers, markets and 
stakeholders that seafood from 
Alaska is responsibly managed. 
Participation and Openness Voluntary; world wide for wild 
capture fisheries, including some 
enhanced 
Voluntary, geographical restriction: 
only fish from Alaska.  
Geographic Scope Global Sub-national, Alaska 
Category Third Party Third Party through Global Trust 
acting as an independent 
certification body that conducts 
fisheries assessments to the RFM 
Fisheries Standard. 
Product and Market Scope Wild-capture and enhanced: 188 
certified fisheries, 106 further 
fisheries in assessment.  
Wild-capture; 7 certified fisheries.  
SOURCE: Adapted from James Sullivan Consulting (2012). “Smart Fishing Initiative: Comparison of Wild 
Capture Fisheries Schemes-Update.” Switzerland: World Wildlife Fund for Nature, September, data from 
Agnew at al. 2013 and FAO- Committee on Fisheries (2014).  
 
The Environmental Law Institute (ELI 2012) completed a credibility review of 
seafood certification based on the FAO Code of Conduct Guidelines. The reports conclusions 
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were drawn from three critical findings. First, the ELI review states that the FAO does not 
support and did not intend for its documents to be directly used for certification. Second, the 
FAO does not undertake the responsibilities of a standard setting body or certification 
scheme owner. Third, neither the FAO Code of Guidelines nor Global Trust’s “translation” 
of them contains the measurable performance indicators necessary for certification. Their 
review concluded that the FAO Guidelines and Code of Conduct are not certification 
standards and cannot be used as such without additional standard setting to establish 
measurable performance elements, a process that also needs to conform to the FAO 
Guidelines in order to be credible. The ELI (2012) found that Global Trust’s “FAO based” 
Certification schemes had not established additional standard setting, and still had not done 
so as of April 2015, when ELI was contacted regarding the current status of their report.  
The ELI concluded that Global Trust, as a certifier, could not also undertake standard 
setting without creating a conflict of interest that violates the FAO Guidelines. This is 
because if the standard was developed and owned by its clients, the scheme would lack 
independence. In either case, Global Trust’s conformance criteria lack measurable 
performance indicators and were not created through a Guidelines compliant process. 
Therefore, the conformance criteria do not conform to the Guidelines. As a result, this Global 
Trust “FAO based” certification system lacks credibility. Both its standards and process 
failed to meet the minimum requirements for independent third party certification set out by 
the international community. The ELI’s report shattered the credibility of Global Trust’s 
third party FAO-based approach to verifying the sustainability of Alaska salmon through the 
RFM Certification program. However, this did not stop Alaska stakeholders from continuing 
to advocate for the RFM program and resist the MSC. 
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Certification experts have reached similar conclusions about Global Trust. Fish First 
Consulting (Taylor 2013) outlines components of an effective and credible eco-certification, 
and compares and contrasts the MSC and Global Trust to the outlined components. Of the 
nine components of an effective and credible eco-label, the MSC achieved all the 
components, while Global Trust only met 1. The comparison highlights that one of the key 
strengths of the MSC’s sustainability criteria is that it actively monitors and accesses the 
performance of a fishery relative to an internationally accepted set of principles and criteria 
for sustainable fisheries.  
In contrast, ASMI’s FAO-based RFM, certified by Global Trust, only confirms 
whether Alaska fisheries have a management regime in place that conforms to FAO’s Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. It does not assess Alaska salmon stocks, the overall 
fishery, or management decisions against rigorous internationally accepted performance 
measures (Taylor 2013). The analysis found that the difference in the rigor and credibility of 
the two certifiers are well documented in their respective Alaska salmon assessments. Citing 
the most recent Alaska certification reports, MSC’s certifier identified 70 areas that required 
improvements; while, Global Trust’s assessment of the same fishery identified no areas 
requiring corrective actions. Taylor notes that the MSC’s conditions of improvements and 
implementation timelines have encouraged conservation groups to support certification of 
fisheries that are on a sustainable footing, but still are in need of improvements.  
These three reviews of ASMI’s FAO-based RFM Certification, certified by Global 
Trust provides valuable insight into how these eco-certifications are in fact different. The 
MSC and ASMI’s FAO-based RFM certification are simply not equivalent measurements of 
fishery sustainability. The MSC is a verified third party fishery eco-label; while, Global 
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Trust, acting in the capacity of an independent certification body, only evaluated whether a 
management agency’s standards reflected FAO guidelines. The politics that took place 
during the transition from the MSC to ASMI’s FAO-based RFM certification will bring the 
case study of Alaskan salmon to date.  
The Politics of Four MSC Client Transfers: Part 2, from 2012 to 2015 
 This case study reveals strong opposition and deeply rooted politics associated with 
Alaska’s continued MSC certificate. The processors withdrew from the MSC certification in 
2012 and created the ASMI FAO-based RFM certification. For over three years, Alaska 
stakeholders resisted and tried to halt the MSC certification, and purported that the two labels 
could co-exist in Alaska. When European markets refused to buy salmon that was not MSC 
certified, the processors wanted back into the MSC program to access these markets 
(Bauman 2015). Most accounts of the Alaska eco-labelling case have focused on the cost 
factor almost exclusively (Foley and Herbert 2013). My research suggests another answer. 
This section documents the important events that occurred from 2012 to July 2015.  
In January 2012, AFDF announced it would discontinue its participation in the MSC 
because eight major seafood companies, which collectively process nearly 80% of Alaska 
salmon, decided to phase out their financial support for the MSC recertification. AFDF 
would remain the client through October 2012, when the certificate expired, and would not 
maintain certification beyond the expiration date. In April 2012, the PSVOA, which protects 
and promotes the interests of the purse seine fleet throughout Alaska and the West Coast, 
agreed to become the new client.  
Although salmon is the dominant fishery, many PSVOA members have diversified 
into multiple fisheries including: squid, crab, sardines, cod and quota long-line fisheries. 
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PSVOA also offers marine insurance coverage to purse seiners and other small boat fleets 
through fisherman-owned insurance pools. Membership in the PSVOA is limited to the 
members in the Seine Vessel Reserve (SVR) insurance pool and any individual or business 
that wants to be a member, who has a vested interest in the fishing industry. To qualify as a 
PSVOA member, one must own some or all of a fishing business, or have a business that is 
directly associated with commercial fishing. Members apply through the SVR Board and the 
PSVOA Board of Directors.  
With 328 members, 49 percent are seine permit holders and 11 percent are businesses 
that are not part of the SVR. Limited entry seine permits are consistently one of the most 
valuable and lucrative permits in all of Alaska. 42 percent of all Southeast seiners are 
members of the PSVOA. A five-year average of annual gross earnings for the highest 
producing Southeast seiners (top 12 percent of permits) from 2010-2014 was $746,923 
(CFEC 2014). PSVOA membership represents a very small percentage of all Alaska 
fishermen, less than 1 percent. 
While PSVOA continued to pursue MSC recertification, ASMI proceeded to develop 
and market their new RFM certification. In May 2012, ASMI orchestrated a letter signed by 
27 salmon processors reaffirming their withdrawal from the MSC process. According to the 
letter, they wanted no “confusion in the marketplace” and had “no intention” of supporting 
further MSC certification. The letter also stated their belief that “the action to withdraw from 
the MSC salmon scheme is in the best interest of the Alaska salmon industry, an industry in 
which is heavily invested in the future of Alaska, our fisherman, their families and our 
companies” (Zuanich 2015).  
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In the Global Trust (2011) ‘FAO-based Responsible Fishing Management 
Certification Full Assessment and Certification Report for the US Alaska Commercial 
Salmon Fisheries, Trident (one of the largest fish processors in Alaska) wrote a letter to the 
then Alaska Governor Parnell stating that hatcheries are regarded as economically essential 
by the State of Alaska industry (p. 181). This is important to note because it highlights the 
common interest of the processors and the State of Alaska in preserving their golden goose, 
the salmon enhancement program. In 2012, Alaska salmon hatcheries accounted for the 
release of an estimated 1.7 billion juveniles that resulted in an estimated 37 million fish 
return (Vercessi 2013, p. 4). This accounts for 29 percent of all harvested salmon in Alaska. 
This means that the Alaska salmon industry harvest around 37 million hatchery produced 
salmon that would otherwise not exist, worth an estimated exvessel5 value of $149 million. In 
addition, these millions of hatchery salmon are currently labeled and sold on the world 
market as ‘wild Alaskan salmon.’ 
From 2012 to 2015, the Alaska salmon case study took many turns, resulting in a 
complicated and controversial few years. Zuanich (2015) documents important milestones 
that occurred during that time in a letter from the ASPA to Trident Fisheries (see appendix). 
These include: November 2012, the PSVOA invited the ASMI Board Chairman to address 
the full membership on the issue of third party verification of fishery sustainability. 
According to Zuanich (2015), “instead he delivered a damning indictment of the PSVOA 
decision to become an MSC client and urged withdrawal as the MSC client.” Then in 
December of 2012, ASMI enlisted then Governor Parnell to have the Commissioners of Fish 
& Game and Commerce & Economic Development meet with PSVOA to express the State’s 
																																								 																				
5Exvessel value is the post season adjusted price per pound for the first purchase of commercial harvest. 		
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concern with MSC certification relating to governance, loss of market access and erosion of 
the Alaska brand.  
In addition, in February 2012, ASMI drafted and urged passage of a resolution by the 
United Fisherman of Alaska (UFA) to reject MSC certification for Alaska salmon on a 
variety of bases. The United Fisherman of Alaska is the statewide commercial fishing trade 
organization, representing 35 Alaska commercial fishing organizations throughout the state 
and its offshore waters. Their mission is to promote and protect the common interest of 
Alaska’s commercial fishing industry as a vital component of Alaska’s social and economic 
well-being.  UFA Resolution 2013-1 (see appendix) is titled, “A resolution of the United 
Fisherman of Alaska supporting the State of Alaska and the Alaska Seafood Marking 
Institute’s decision to offer third party fisheries certification and to seek alternative 
certification criteria under internationally recognized standards” (UFA 2013).  
Analysis of the UFA Resolution reveals a factually flawed argument leading to five 
resolutions. This resolution states, “MSC violates Alaska’s constitution because of the 
substitution of the MSC for the State of Alaska seafood directed management.” The Alaska 
constitution establishes that the Alaska legislature shall provide for the utilization, 
development and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State. A factual 
review of this resolution found that MSC certification does not replace the State of Alaska’s 
management because MSC is a third party organization that works in partnership with 
independent verifiers to certify the sustainability of fishery management. Alaska has the 
liberty to undergo any eco-label certification of their choosing for all natural resources 
belonging to the State.  
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UFA resolved that “MSC as the only third party certifier for Alaska seafood 
sustainability could effectively control the supply chain between Alaska seafood processors 
and Alaska salmon customers.” Again, UFA’s facts are misguided because MSC is not the 
only third party certifier. ASMI’s RFM certification has certified five other fisheries 
alongside MSC. Therefore, MSC cannot effectively control the supply chain between Alaska 
seafood producers and Alaska salmon customers.  
The UFA resolution calls for “the need of an objective standard for sustainability 
certification.” Objective is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as based on facts, 
rather than feelings or opinions, and not influenced by feelings. The world’s largest third-
party sustainability standard for verification of wild capture fisheries, the MSC certification 
criteria are widely accepted to be an objective standard for sustainability eco-certification. A 
fishery is deemed qualified to bare their MSC label after successfully passing an independent 
assessment based on science of stock parameters.   
Continuing into September of 2013, ASMI urged the Alaska Congressional 
Delegation to hold hearings on the role of certification in rewarding sustainable fisheries, 
which then went to Congress. Influenced by Alaska senator Lisa Murkowski, the US General 
Services Administration updated its purchasing guidelines. This exempted American 
managed fisheries from third party certification to demonstrate responsible and sustainable 
practices.  Previously the recommendation in the guidelines was that any seafood purchased 
should always be “Best Choices or “Good Alternatives” on the Monterrey Bay Aquarium 
Seafood Watch list or certified sustainable by the MSC, or approved by an equivalent 
program.  This change allows federal government contractors, such as for the Department of 
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Defense and the National Park Service, to purchase US seafood without a sustainability eco-
label.  
The opposition to MSC recertification in 2013 was fierce due to four compounding 
reasons, the overarching issue being the possibility that some units of certification may not 
be recertified due to sustainability concerns regarding hatcheries. First, during the 2007 
reassessment, units of certification established an evaluation methodology for regional 
fisheries sustainability. The units of certification faced criticism because individual fisheries 
could be singled out for not meeting the sustainability criteria. Second, going into the 2012 
MSC reassessment process, conditions of certification were still unmet, many directly related 
to hatcheries. Third, the largest hatchery study had just begun to investigate hatchery and 
wild salmon interactions in Prince William Sound and Southeast Alaska. Fourth, a plethora 
of new research publications provided empirical evidence that hatchery salmon are having a 
negative impact on wild salmon survival (Brenner, Moffitt and Grant 2012; Gardner et al. 
2004; Grant 2012; Naish et al. 2008; Rand et al. 2012; Ruggerone, Agler and Nielsen 2012; 
Ruggerone et al. 2010). The most significant of these studies relate to straying of hatchery 
fish into wild salmon rivers and competition for food at sea. 
Despite all the criticism that the PSVOA faced, successful MSC recertification 
occurred in November 2013, a year after the prior certification had expired. The Prince 
William Sound unit did not meet MSC criteria because of their industrial hatchery 
production. Further evaluation was necessary to determine the impact of hatchery releases on 
wild stocks.  This was the first time one of Alaska’s areas failed the MSC assessment 
process. Chart 1 provides a five year average of the Alaska commercial harvest of hatchery 
produced fish, by region from 2010-2014. The data was compiled from five Alaska 
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Department of Fish and Game annual reports. It illustrates the percentage of the commercial 
common property harvest and location of hatchery produced salmon in Alaska. This chart is 
important because it shows the magnitude of hatchery produced fish, especially in Prince 
William Sound. This chart shows that 77 percent of all Alaska’s hatchery production has 
occurred in Prince William Sound over the past five years. The increased scale of investment 
and reliance on hatchery produced fish directly correlates to the strong opposition of the 
processors and the State of Alaska with MSC involvement. 
	
*CCPH- Commercial Common Property Harvest. Data from State of Alaska, Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game, Alaska Salmon Fisheries Enhancement Program Annual Reports: White (2011) and Verssessi (2012-
2015). See Appendix for Table 2- Regional Percentage of Alaska Commercial Harvest of CCPH Hatchery 
Produced Fish, from 2010-2014 and Five Year Average. 
After the PSVOA succeeded in achieving MSC certified sustainable salmon, ASMI 
issued a press release emphasizing that most of Alaska salmon will not carry the MSC label. 
The major salmon producers also remained opposed to MSC certification of Alaska salmon. 
Most of the salmon would not have the MSC label because six of the largest salmon 
processors were not part of the client group. In 2013, the majority of Alaska stakeholders 










Southeast Prince William 
Sound 
Kodiak Cook Inlet 
Chart 1- Five Year Average of Alaska Commercial Harvest of 
CCPH* Hatchery Produced Fish, by Region, 2010-2014. 
	47	
certification. Strong opposition continued because it was in their interest to not bring 
attention to the sustainability issue of industrial hatchery production negatively impacting 
wild stocks.  
Then in April 2014, under heavy pressure from these big seafood processors and the 
Governor of Alaska’s office, the PSVOA withdrew as the MSC fishery client. The Alaska 
Seafood Producers Association, Inc. (ASPA) was then formed and became the new, and 
fourth MSC client since 2009. The Executive Director of ASPA is Robert Zuanich, who is 
also a managing partner of Silver Bay Seafoods, LLC and a member of the PSVOA. Silver 
Bay Seafoods is a fishermen-owned seafood processing company that is headquartered in the 
Southeast, Alaska town of Sitka. In January 2015, the ASPA withdrew the Prince William 
Sound unit of certification from continued MSC assessment. It remains uncertified by the 
MSC today. Interestingly, the MSC never released the Prince William Sound final report 
from 2013. In October of 2014, the MSC published the ‘New Fisheries Certification 
Requirements to the MSC Standards (version 2.0).’ It became effective on the first of April 
in 2015 (MSC v2.0 2014). One of the 10 key updates in version 2.0 introduces an entirely 
new default standard for the assessment of enhanced salmon fisheries. It was developed 
following six years of discussion with stakeholders. The new criteria made it even more 
difficult for Prince William Sound to meet the MSC FAM criteria.  
Finally, in April of 2015 the ASPA received an email on behalf of the processors that 
originally withdrew from the MSC in 2012. The processors wanted back into MSC because 
buyers in Europe refused to buy their products without the MSC stamp of approval (Bauman 
2015). Wanting to share the MSC certification for the Alaska salmon fishery for the 2015 
season, they asked the ASPA to vote on their request a few days later at their scheduled 
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meeting. When the ASPA vote did not occur on that day, articles appeared in industry blogs, 
which intended to apply pressure on the ASPA. This was a tactic that mirrors the anti-MSC 
campaign of 2012-2013. ASPA responded to the letter in May 2015, denying them admission 
to the client group and the ability to use the MSC label for the 2015 season, but offered to 
resume the discussion after the season in September. When mediation between the ASPA and 
the processors for MSC certification sharing failed, the Governor of Alaska wrote a letter to 
the MSC Executive Director urging for “fairness.” Governor Walker stated,  
“It is extremely difficult for the State to apply financial resources, working with the 
assessment team, and a compliance audit team, if the resulting certificate is denied to 75 
percent or more of the resulting participants. This is an issue of fairness for the fisherman and 
coastal communities in Alaska, even for Alaska herself” (Parker 2015).  
 
With MSC certificate sharing negotiations unsuccessful, the Pacific Seafood Processors 
Association (PSPA) filed to begin a new assessment of Alaska salmon with the MSC 
(Stewart 2015). This made the PSPA the second MSC client organization to the Alaska 
salmon fishery.  
To analyze this case study, a survey was administered to Alaska stakeholders to 
clarify the events that occurred between 2012 and 2015. Throughout this case study, there 
has been a subtle “other” reason in the literature to explain why Alaska producers and 
industry stakeholders withdrew from MSC and pursued the alternative RFM certification. It 
was mentioned in footnotes in Herbert and Foley’s (2013) analysis of the Alaska case, but 
explicitly expressed by four environmental NGOs in an April 2013 letter in response to 
Alaska stakeholders withdrawing from the MSC (Beardslee et al. 2013). This letter linked 
that the withdrawal is related to fisheries sustainability issues. The seafood media published 
the view that anyone in Europe who acts on the NGOs letter is simply responding to 
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propaganda, and is not evaluating anything to do with sustainability or science (Sackton 
2013). Zuanich (2015) went on to frame the MSC Alaska salmon recertification debate as: 
“Seeing a group of large processors who attempted to destroy the MSC certification of 
Alaska salmon through almost any means possible. When the major salmon producers 
withdrew MSC support, ASPA members recognized the 80% of salmon producers opposition 
to MSC and the perceived need to develop the alternative Responsible Fisheries Management 
(“RFM”) or perhaps some other certification process, particularly in view of the current 
adversity between MSC assessment standards and Alaska’s hatchery management practices. 
What we did not understand was the suggested incompatibility of parallel MSC and RFM 
salmon certifications when other Alaska fisheries co-existed with both certification regimes.”  
 
Other Alaska fisheries that amicably co-exist with the MSC and RFM certifications are 
Alaska cod, flatfish and pollock. If three other Alaskan fisheries could co-exist alongside 
MSC, Alaska salmon could too. However, the Governor’s office worried that continued MSC 
certification of Alaska salmon would “erode” the Alaska brand.  
This section documented the important events that occurred from 2012 to July 2015. 
The Alaska eco-certification case study has shown the strong opposition and deeply rooted 
politics that ensued after the AFDF announced in January 2012 that it would discontinue its 
participation with the MSC, because the major processors withdrew financial support for the 
MSC recertification. To examine this specific time period and the realm of possible 
explanations to this research question, a strictly confidential survey was administered to a 
wide range of Alaska stakeholders to further investigate the motivations for why the 
processors initially withdrew in 2012.   
The Marine Eco-Labels Survey Results 
A variety of methods were used to collect this data. The majority of information was 
acquired through an e-survey from January to March of 2016. Twenty individuals 
representing Alaska stakeholders responded. In addition, three informal interviews were 
conducted over the phone, and two participants that did not take the survey significantly 
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contributed to this research by responding to critical questions over email. Of the three phone 
interviews, two people participated in the survey and the other person did not. A total of 
twenty-three individuals from different organizations participated in this study. Alaska 
stakeholders that were invited to participate included: representatives of the MSC, ASMI, 
processors, fisherman organizations, business interests, hatchery non-profit corporations, 
agency and research scientists and NGOs. To protect all research participants’ 
confidentiality, no specific response is attributed to an individual person or organization. All 
findings and conclusions presented are my own.  
Some respondents contested the survey wording. Specifically the phrase, “ASMI’s 
FAO-based RFM program, certified by Global Trust.” Multiple survey respondents clarified 
that in the current form of the ASMI conformance criteria, Global Trust does not ‘certify.’ It 
was acknowledged by ASMI through email correspondence that when the program started, 
Global Trust did have a different role. Currently, Global Trust is one of ASMI’s approved 
independent certification bodies that conduct fisheries assessments to the RFM Fisheries 
Standard. This discrepancy between the prior and current role of Global Trust does not affect 
the validity of these findings because this research specifically focuses on the time period in 
2012 when the processors withdrew from the MSC and pursued ASMI’s RFM program. The 
motivations and legitimacy of the prior form of ASMI’s FAO-based RFM program is at the 
heart of this study, regardless of the changes that have occurred since the original program 
was launched.  
The survey was divided into three sections. The first section pertained to the case 
study of Alaska salmon. The second section addressed concerns of eco-label legitimacy, 
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particularly in regards to how ASMI’s conformance criteria compared to the MSC’s. The 
third section sought to clarify issues relating to the sustainability of Alaska salmon. 
From this survey, it can be determined that the cost associated with the MSC label was not a 
significant factor to explain the processors withdrawal from the MSC and the transition to 
ASMI’s RFM program. In fact, survey data suggested that MSC had agreed to pay the bulk 
of the reassessment costs (Table 3, Comment 1.1). MSC was contacted to confirm this, but 
had not responded upon completion of this study.  
Question 1 asked, ‘Why did a group of processors withdraw from the Marine 
Stewardship Council certification program in 2012 and join ASMI's FAO-based RFM 
program, certified by Global Trust?’	These results suggest the following factors to explain 
why the processors moved from the MSC to ASMI’s program: Seafood processors wanted 
more control of labelling guidelines, MSC’s conditions for certification were too demanding, 
and tension between the MSC assessment standard and Alaska’s hatchery management 
existed. These findings support that sustainability issues that were perceived to make it more 
difficult to become certified, were a powerful motive for the processors to withdraw from the 
MSC reassessment and pursue an alternative.  Chart 2 displays the findings from four 
questions in Question 1 that are related to issues of the MSC. 
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 Statement ‘a’ results show that a combined6 response of 63 percent disagreed that ‘the 
MSC label use fees were too expensive.’ While 26 percent of respondents were neutral, only 
11 percent agreed with the statement. Statement ‘b’ tested whether the cost of the MSC 
reassessment was too expensive, which was the most cited reason to explain why the 
processors left the MSC (Foley and Herbert 2013). The survey results found that a combined 
response of 53 percent disagreed with statement ‘b.’ While 21 percent were neutral, a 
combined 26 percent agreed that cost of reassessment as a reason for why the processors 
withdrew from the MSC. From statement ‘c,’ a combined response of 50 percent agreed that 
MSC’s conditions for certification were too demanding. Despite 39 percent being neutral and 
11 percent disagreeing, this draws attention to the possibility of a new motive relating to a 
sustainability issue being present in this case study. Chart 3 details the findings from the 
remaining three questions in Question 1 that pertain to processors and hatcheries. 
																																								 																				



















d.There were too many MSC Conditions left 
unresolved. 
c. MSC’s Conditions for Certification were too 
demanding. 
b.The cost of MSC reassessment was too 
expensive. 
a.The MSC label use fees were too expensive. 
Chart 2. Results by Percentage Pertaining to the MSC in Response to 
Question 1, (n=19).  
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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It can also be determined from Question 1 that seafood processors wanted more 
control of labelling guidelines and that existing tension between the MSC assessment 
standard and Alaska’s hatchery management were significant factors to explain why a group 
of processors withdrew from the MSC and joined ASMI’s FAO-based RFM program. While 
a combined response of 42 percent agreed with statement ‘e,’ 32 percent of respondents were 
neutral and 26 percent disagreed. There is slightly stronger evidence in support of statement 
‘f,’ than for statement ‘e.’ A combined response of 50 percent of respondents agreed with 
statement ‘f,’ while 39 percent was neutral and 11 percent disagreed.  
 Statement ‘g’ results provide the strongest evidence out of all seven statements tested 
in Question 1. A combined response of 68 percent agreed that tension between the MSC 
assessment standard and Alaska’s hatchery management was a factor for the processors 
withdrawing from the MSC certification and joining ASMI’s RFM program. While 26 
percent were neutral, only one respondent disagreed. These findings provide strong support 














g.There was tension between the MSC assessment 
standard and Alaska’s hatchery management. 
f. Seafood Processors wanted more control of 
labeling guidelines. 
e. Seafood Processors feared they would not meet 
re-certification requirements. 
Chart 3. Results by Percentage Pertaining to Processors and Hatcheries 
in Response to Question 1, (n=19)  
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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 Table 5 lists responses from the “other (please specify)” and comments received from 
the survey. These results provide valuable qualitative data to further understand the 
motivations of not only the processors, but also the Alaska stakeholders.  This confidential 
survey sought out stakeholders knowledgeable on this specific time period and issue, 
providing them the opportunity to shed light to new factors. 
Table 3. ‘Other’ and Comments Responses from Question 1, (n=14). 
	
1.1 MSC had agreed to pay the bulk of the reassessment costs.  
1.2 ASMI was cheaper and less stringent, and the Alaskans thought the Alaskan brand could 
carry the day without MSC.  
1.3 There was a mis-perception of MSC certification value in the market place by most 
processors.  
1.4 An important consideration: Alaska has a pretty libertarian culture and Alaskans don't like to 
be told what to do by outsiders.  
1.5 MSC splitting fisheries up for assessment, with the possibility of a mix of certified and 
uncertified fisheries.  
1.6 Alaska takes a very independent approach to its fisheries and marketing. MSC, being an 
external verifier, runs somewhat counter to that philosophy.  
1.7 Strongly agree: There was continuing tension between AK industry and MSC over a 
perception that the MSC logo was undermining the value of the Alaska-ASMI brand. 
1.8 I believe the issue with potentially not meeting certification requirements was a primary issue. 
The Alaskan clients- stakeholders had always held a strong position of an all or none 
certification. To fail a unit like PWS and highlight issues surrounding AK hatchery management 
would have create (and subsequently did create) significant reputational risk, and at a time when 
processors were writing letters to the state advocating significant increases in hatchery 
production. Also the insular nature of AK and their belief of absolute preeminence in the fisheries 
management and sustainability universe cannot be understated as an overlaying motivator in 
many things they do. The emotional feelings in AK around these issues can at times be as strong 
as any objective or strategic analysis around specific issues.  
1.9 I believe that the major salmon processors pulled out of the last assessment because pre‐
assessment discussions led them to believe that Prince William Sound and Southeast Alaska 
would have trouble getting certified. MSC certifies wild stock fisheries, and both of these regions 
have transitioned to large-scale ocean ranching that in some cases dwarfs local stocks. ASMI’s 
certification program is much less rigorous than MSC’s program, and I believe the thinking was 
that both of these regions would pass. I believe that the major processors stepped back in because 
the interim client would not share the certification (that he paid for—there was a lot of discussion 
in the press on this). The interim client was able to market his product in Europe or other markets 
that value the MSC label. The major processors lost access to some of these markets and were 
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stuck with surplus product from some areas like Bristol Bay.  
1.10 The processors expressed an “all or nothing” attitude when they sensed issues with PWS 
regarding hatcheries.  MSC was not the one to raise those issues.  The independent certifier for 
MSC assessment was made aware of scientific reports, some by ADFG scientists, raising concern 
about the sustainability of wild stocks due to the large presence of hatchery stocks. 
1.11 You would need to ask the processors who left what their reasons for leaving were. 
1.12 There is very little space on consumer packaging. Alaska feels a big point of differentiation 
in selling their seafood comes from their own brand origin, since 'seafood is a product of its 
environment'. By having to use the MSC eco-label instead of an origin logo from Alaska, some 
felt their own brands were being diluted. 
1.13 The Alaskan fisheries feel that they both meet and exceed MSC audit requirements and that 
it should be obvious since Alaskan law says that fisheries in the state are sustainable. The issues 
were cost (i.e. no real audit is needed since it is required that they be sustainable and it should be 
obvious that they are) and the fact that MSC is foreign controlled (almost every media story 
refers to MSC as a UK company or some variant of it).  
1.14 Instead of 'neutral' as a choice, it would be helpful to have a N/A. Also, some of the 
terminology above isn't accurate. For example Global Trust doesn't 'certify' the Alaska RFM 
Program. Rather, they were awarded an RFP to take the FAO key reference documents and 
develop auditable criteria. They responded in the capacity of a consultancy vs. as a 'certification 
body' (CB). Many CBs have arms or revenue streams within their organizations that perform 
various types of consultant work. The AK RFM Program is an ISO (International Organization 
for Standardization) 'accredited', and also accredited by the Irish National Accreditation Board. 
The only role Global Trust plays in the program today is as an approved Certification Body that 
performs fisheries and chain of custody assessments.  
1.15 #3 "MSC’s Conditions for Certification were too demanding." Demanding is not the word. 
Misguided, irrelevant, prejudiced come to mind. MSC's conditions were tantamount to a 
re-forming of Alaska's salmon management based on their perceptions from a depleted 
worldview that is irrelevant in Alaska. 
1.16 A question that may also be worth considering is whether the MSC label provides value. 
This is different to the cost of certification being prohibitive. I am not aware of the reasons why 
the processors decided to withdraw from the MSC certification program, and I do not feel that it 
would be appropriate for me to guess. 
1.17 MSC’s standard changes and the quality and objectivity of assessments depend on the 
assessment team. Some assessors tend to be influenced by the weight of stakeholder input rather 
than weight of evidence. The MSC brand was threatening to erode the Alaska brand. The MSC 
standard and assessment process can undermine the regional public process to establish research 
and management priorities. ASMI's program is ISO-accredited, not "certified by Global Trust". 
Global Trust is an ISO-accredited certification body, but another ISO-accredited certification 
body is now eligible to assess fisheries under the RFM program (DNV). 
 
This data provides a wide spread of new possible factors, all of which were not 
included as options to evaluate in the survey. The factor of the MSC reassessment splitting 
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fisheries up for assessment, with the possibility of a mix of certified and uncertified fisheries 
(comments 1.5 and 1.8), further supports the “all or nothing” explanation (1.10). Alaska’s 
independent stance is a theme that is frequently referred to in this data (1.4, 1.6 and 1.8). In 
addition, the factor of the perceived value of the MSC label (1.3 and 1.16), the lesser cost and 
stringency (1.2) and an undermined Alaska brand (1.7 and 1.12) are also insightful to 
understanding the possible initial motivations for the processors withdrawal from the MSC in 
2012.  
The second section of the survey investigated eco-label legitimacy. Question 3 
addressed how ASMI’s conformance criteria compared to the MSC’s. Chart 4 details the 
response results from Question 3 of the survey. The variability in responses is note-worthy, 
especially the percentage of people who responded neutrally. Most respondents (72 percent) 
are in agreement with statement ‘c,’ that ASMI’s RFM program evaluates whether a 
management agency’s standards reflect FAO guidelines. While there is strong agreement 
among respondents to statement ‘a,’ that stock assessment relative to standard are required 
(56 percent), statement ‘j’ results reflect that 44 percent of respondents disagree that ASMI’s 
conformance criteria maintain independence of certifier, client/management agency and 
standard. The remaining results of statements regarding legitimacy of ASMI’s RFM 
conformance criteria are inconclusive, with the majority having an even opinion spread, more 
often than not towards neutrality. In this regard, these results are insightful because there is a 
clear divide of opinion on the legitimacy of ASMI’s conformance criteria among a wide 
range of Alaska stakeholders. Table 4 provides valuable data to support the findings reported 
















































j. Independence of Certifier, Client/Management 
agency, and standards is maintained 
i. Advances in science, FAO standards and 
international "best practices," are incorporated 
h. Stakeholder involvement is encouraged 
g. The certification process is transparent 
f. Consequences are identified if required 
improvements are not made 
e. Commitment is obtained from a management 
agency to address required improvements within a 
specific time frame 
d. Required improvements relative to an 
internationally accepted set of standards for 
sustainable fishing are identifed 
c. Evaluates whether a management agency's 
standards reflect FAO guidelines 
b. Assessment of the environmental impact of the 
fishery is required 
a. Stock assessment relative to standards is required 
Chart 4. Results by Percentage to Question 3, Does ASMI's FAO-
Based RFM Conformance Criteria Include the Following Components 
of an Effective and Credible Eco-Certification? (n=18).  
 
Agree Neutral Disagree Don't Know 
	58	
Table 4. Comments in Response to Question 3, (n=15). 
3.1 It is a little difficult to answer some of these questions since the ASMI-RFM program is not static and is 
undergoing a continuing process of review and potential improvement, the effectiveness of which can't 
really be pre-judged. The scheme relies heavily on whether an effective management exists and should be 
able to respond to needed change more than it assesses based on actual outcome performance, though that's 
not uniformly the case. The first statement above is not clearly worded. Environmental impacts of fishing 
doesn't substantively include assessment of the impacts of the hatchery system that supports the fisheries.  
3.2 I have not looked at RFM in a long time, so I did not answer these. I know it is much less 
comprehensive than MSC, although I understand RFM is making changes. A key problem is that RFM did 
not evaluate performance of the management system. It was more about policy, and Alaska salmon has best 
policy in the world, they just do not always implement that policy. Also, I believe 2 of the original 
scientists on the RFM team were also on Board of Directors of Hatcheries. This changed during last review.  
3.3 I have not reviewed ASMI's RFM, and don't intend to. I don't trust self-certification.  
3.4 The FAO does not maintain a standard, only offers broad guidelines. The large processors fund and 
govern ASMI, so the processors essentially created their own certification system, that is not independent 
or scientifically rigorous.  
3.5 There was a consultation on the RFM conformance criteria last year, and the comments submitted by 
stakeholders a good resource for reviewing issues with the RFM standard as it currently stands.  
 
3.6 Eco-certification does not obligate the management agency to any action (unless they are the client) 
except through industry interaction.  
3.7 The ASMI standard amount too little more than industry self certification. It is a joke.  
3.8 I'm not intimately acquainted with the ASMI process; however, ADFG has openly stated that the ASMI 
process was very agency friendly: no real evaluation of the fishery was required for certification. 
Certification apparently depended upon agency policies and not upon the implementation or effectiveness 
of policies.  
3.9 Prior to RFM program reforms, there was a lack of transparency in assessments, stakeholder 
participation was not welcome, and there was no independence between scheme owner and fishery client. 
Recent program reforms that are just being implemented are intended to address the previous defects in the 
RFM program.  
3.10 Generally I would say the RFM standard focused on whether management had systems in place on the 
books, but did not assess actual performance. I also note that ASMI has been working to improve the RFM 
program is ways that may address some of the issues mentioned above.  
3.11 Only in the past year has there been acknowledgement that the standard is a complex document 
created by an unnamed body. The claim that the FAO guidelines are a standard is wrong on a number of 
accounts, it was not written as a standard and it applies to member states of the FAO and not to fisheries. 
Note that ASMI is a body of the State of Alaska, the governor appoints the board. Also, its system assesses 
agencies of the State of Alaska - this appears to be a conflict of interest.  
3.12 The AK RFM Conformance Criteria is transparent and readily available on the ASMI website. The 
Standard is developed by an independent group of experts known as the 'Conformance Criteria Committee' 
(CCC). All members of this committee and their bios are also on the ASMI website. ASMI is currently 
working toward Version 2.0 and this will go out for a 60-day public comment period where stakeholder 
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comments will be taken on board and responded to by the CCC.  
3.13 The most comprehensive review of the ASMI program is in a report that was prepared by Accenture in 
2012 (James Sullivan Consulting).  
3.14 It has been a long time since I reviewed the Alaskan RFM standard and I am not aware of what 
changes that have been made, although I am aware that they have made changes. I do not have the time to 
review the standard at this time to provide more detailed feedback. 
 
3.15 The Alaska RFM program meets all requirements for credible 3rd party seafood certification schemes 
as defined by the Global Seafood Sustainability Initiative (GSSI). I don't think the RFM program issues 
conditional certifications, so the middle two questions would not be relevant. The response to "best 
practices" depends on if you are referencing FAO adopted documents. If so, I agree. 
 
 
There is agreement among the Question 3 comments that the ASMI RFM program is 
not static and currently undergoing reforms (3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 3.12 and 3.14). Many 
comments also articulate that the RFM program relies heavily on whether an effective 
management exists and should be able to respond to needed change, more than the 
implementation or effectiveness of polices (3.1, 3.2, 3.8 and 3.10). In addition, two 
comments suggest that ASMI’s RFM program is ‘self certification,’ (3.3 and 3.7). Others 
went on to state that it is not independent or scientifically rigorous (3.4) and there is a 
conflict of interest due to ASMI being a body of the State of Alaska, with governor appointed 
boards (3.11) and two of the original scientists on the RFM team originally also being on the 
Board of Directors of Hatcheries (3.2).   
Question 5 of the survey asked participants whether the ASMI and MSC conformance 
criteria are equivalent in sustainability stringency. 48 percent of respondents disagreed, while 
26 percent remained neutral and 21 percent agreed. There is agreement that ASMI’s 
certification criteria are less rigorous and comprehensive than the MSC’s conformance 
criteria (Environmental Law Institute 2012; James Sullivan Consulting 2012; Taylor 2013; 
Table 3, comments 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9). These findings suggest that the thinking 
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behind the creation of ASMI’s RFM program was that both the Prince William Sound and 
Southeast Alaska regions would pass the new RFM conformance criteria (Table 3: comments 
1.2, 1.8 and 1.9). Table 5 lists all the comments yielded through Question 5.  
		
Table 5. Comments in Response to Question 5, (n=9). 
5.1 If you had asked me in 2012, I would have said no. 
5.2 I have not reviewed RFM in a long long time. I do know that they are making changes to make their 
evaluation more rigorous. MSC has also updated their FAM. 
5.3 Very soft review; apparently fishery is not evaluated; only agency intentions regardless of effect. 
5.4 RFM looks at the management system on the books, but does not evaluate actual performance.  
5.5 ASMI's system includes elements that are the responsibility of governments and other bodies and as 
such contains a number of requirements that the certificate holder cannot be held accountable for.  
5.6 I try to dissuade the use of the word 'equivalent'. Both Standards are rigorous and essentially look at 
similar elements within the fishery. There are different approaches to the scoring algorithms and how 
criteria is referenced. AK RFM looks at 6 key principles, and MSC has P1, P2 and P3. A better question to 
ask, and a better 'bar' by which to measure both programs would be the global benchmark tool by GSSI 
(Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative). This is a rigorous, benchmark tool based on global 
multi-stakeholder input and the FAO key reference documents that audits Certification Schemes in (4) 
areas of Governance, Operations, Fisheries and/or Aquaculture.  
5.7 Having not reviewed the standard recently I cannot comment, however the GSSI process may shed light 
on this. 
5.8 See the SFP comments on the conformance criteria for a list of concerns/areas where RFM isn't 
equivalent with MSC: http://certification.alaskaseafood.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/SFPCC 
Submission.pdf  





Chart 5. Results by Percentage to Question 5- Does 
ASMI's RFM Conformance Criteria Adhere to Equivalent 
Sustainability Stringency Criteria as the Marine 








The variability in findings from both Questions 3 and 5 supports that ASMI is 
currently undergoing review in order to improve their program. Despite this, these findings 
highlight that the credibility of Alaska’s eco-label program has not been firmly established 
amongst Alaska stakeholders, and questions regarding legitimacy of an industry owned eco-
labelling program remain. Question 7 asked respondents whether hatcheries are the most 
debated sustainability issue regarding Alaska salmon.  
 
Respondents provided strong evidence in support of hatcheries being the most 
debated sustainability issue regarding Alaska salmon, with 50 percent responding in 
agreement to the question. The dissent cited the interception of salmon as more of a 
significant issue than hatchery salmon in British Columbia (7.4 and 7.9). The data in Table 4 
provides a better understanding of the behind the scenes sustainability issues that mirror the 
relationship between an ‘all or nothing attitude.’ It also shows the possibility of the MSC 
reassessment splitting fisheries up for assessment, with the possible outcome of a mix of 




Chart 6. Response by Percentage to Question 7, Are 
Hatcheries the Most Debated Sustainability Issue 







Table 6. Comments in Response to Question 7, (n=11). 
 
7.1 There are certainly other concerning factors around the sustainability of Alaska salmon but hatcheries is 
one managers and fisheries has control over. 
 
7.2 Yes if you set aside the associated need to protect habitat. BUT, there was another very significant issue 
beneath the surface in the AK debate and anger with MSC that hasn't been discussed publicly. That was the 
fear that MSC was going to prescribe population specific management objectives and strategies for 
managing spawning escapement. Mixed stock fishery issues have long been a practical challenge for 
salmon fishery managers. In AK historically, with stock being generally quite productive and healthy, the 
management system has been able to operate at pretty aggregate management scales in still provide 
adequate protection for individual spawning populations with establishing escapement goals at that level of 
granularity. But that doesn't ensure weak stocks will be protected and as more weak stock management 
needs arise, the potential impact on harvest opportunity in large-scale purse seine and troll fisheries can be 
a concern. AK looks at MSC as the tail wagging the dog, and heavily influenced by eNGOs and outsiders 
that are interested in imposing population specific management that would be extremely difficult and costly 
to implement. This was a big behind the scenes issue in the MSC debate with AK industry.  
7.3 Just look at the Conditions that were placed on the fishery during the last assessment (and the 2006 
assessment). Nearly all are related to hatcheries. AK has excellent policy with respect to hatcheries and 
protecting/managing wild salmon, but they do not always follow that policy in places like PWS and SEAK. 
Hatcheries are the reason that PWS "failed" MSC certification. I think PWS also recently failed the RFM 
evaluation. Upper management in ADFG & the state (appointed positions) do not like groups like the MSC 
telling the state how to manage, even when independent assessment is simply reminding them about their 
own policy.  
7.4 Enhanced fisheries are definitely a widely discussed issue. Whether it is the 'most debated', I can't say. 
It has definitely received much press, and there has been a lot of misinformation. Alaska is very proud of 
our hatchery programs and we do all that we can to provide accurate information and make sure 
stakeholders understand the difference between Alaska and other parts of the world that may also have 
hatchery practices. 
7.5 Hands down.  
7.6 In British Columbia, Alaskan interceptions of at-risk stocks from Canadian rivers is a more 
controversial issue than Alaska's problematic aquaculture practices.  
7.7 MSC certifies wild stock fisheries. Alaska is moving towards industrial ocean farming in SEAK and 
PWS. Wild stocks cannot be maintained sustainably given the industrial scale of hatcheries.  
7.8 Maybe among people that are uninformed of benefits of hatcheries in protecting wild stocks. Where I 
live there are four or five programs teaching or promoting more fly-fishing. Most fly fishers think they 
have to wade in the streams, and they cause a lot of damage. We have 30,000 people, catch and eat 
mentality, 45 miles of road system with three salmon streams suitable for fishing. So without the local 
hatchery to provide marine and shore based consumptive salmon fisheries, our salmon streams get trampled 
by anglers. The hatchery does not plant fish upriver. Its fish protect the wild fish in the rivers. MSC has no 
conception of this benefit, and their anti-hatchery bias is based on stupid things done elsewhere.  
7.9 I would argue they should be, but I think more public debate has been aimed at chinook by catch.  
7.10 I think this is probably the case for those close to the issue, e.g. producers, government, NGOs, 
however I feel that it has not yet entered the consumer space. 
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7.11 They are debated as far as the MSC is concerned. 
 
 
Several responses are of important concern to this study, especially comments 7.2, 
7.3, 7.7 and 7.10. There were possibly fears stemming from the MSC prescribing population 
specific management objectives and strategies for managing spawning escapement.  This was 
said to be a very significant issue beneath the surface of the Alaska debate that has not been 
discussed publicly (7.2). This comment is a significant factor worthy of further investigation 
because it affects. Comment 7.3 addresses that while Alaska may have excellent 
sustainability polices, they do not always follow it. In addition, the State of Alaska were said 
to dislike being told how to manage, even when independent assessment was reminding them 
about their own policy (7.3).   
Alaska’s salmon management policy has been coined the ‘gold standard’ of wild 
fisheries. However, it was pointed out in the survey responses that Alaska does not always 
follow their own polices. Comment 7.7 illuminates the potential severity of maintaining 
Alaska’s hatchery policy, “MSC certifies wild stock fisheries. Alaska is moving towards 
industrial ocean farming in Southeast and Prince William Sound. Wild stocks cannot be 
maintained sustainably given the industrial scale of hatcheries.” Hatchery salmon production 
has continued to grow over the past 20 years, yet science is saying that hatcheries are 
negatively affecting wild salmon. These findings call the State of Alaska’s salmon 
management polices into question when hatcheries are embedded in political and industry 
interests, and even Alaska herself. Alaskan fisherman and communities have come to 
economically depend on the hatchery system for providing income opportunities, in an 
otherwise limited and rural employment market.  
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When the MSC conformance criteria allow for industrial hatchery salmon to garner 
the same eco-label as wild fish, this does not adequately bring attention to the documented 
sustainability problems associated with hatcheries within the Alaska salmon fishery. When 
consumers go to the store and purchase seafood with the blue MSC-logo, they rely on label 
credibility to help them make responsible purchases. With Alaska’s reliance on hatcheries, 
these survey results bring attention to the dire reality that wild stocks are at increased risk 
because hatcheries have become the status quo for the Alaska industry. Industrial salmon 
hatcheries also exist in Japan and Russia. People around the world need to know that wild 
stocks are at risk in the North Pacific Ocean because of the industrial use of hatcheries by 
Russia, Japan and Alaska. This may help to solve this problem because the market 
mechanism could adjust to reflect this environmental issue through ratcheting up 
sustainability standards for all eco-labelling of salmon.  
The final question of the survey to be reported asked respondents whether they 
thought more fisheries would pursue alternative eco-label certification programs, such as 
ASMI’s FAO-based RFM model in the future. In response to this question, 45 percent 
thought more fisheries would, while 35 percent did not know. This question is important 
because it addresses the current trend of new eco-labels being created as an alternative to the 
MSC certification criteria. While the cost and complexity of setting up a seafood eco-
certification program would seem to make it difficult for very many fisheries to create 
alternative programs, this did not stop particular national and sub-national entities from 
creating new territorially based eco-labelling schemes. Table 7 details important data that 
helps to quantify the future of alternative eco-labels.  
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Table 7. Comments in Response to Question 6, (n=11). 
6.1 It is a problem, as it will confuse the public. The fishing industry just wants a label so they can sell the 
product. They typically do not want to be evaluated so that they can show they have good management. 
They just want to sell the product. Some buyers in Europe will not buy salmon if it is not MSC certified. 
This is what the big processors came back to the MSC process in 2015.  
6.2 I know that other jurisdictions might consider doing so, but an evaluation of the AK experience would 
be very helpful to those who are considering that option. AK has learned some tough lessons about the 
costs and benefits of trying to create an industry program that has similar market traction to independent 
certification schemes. The fact that AK came back into the MSC system due to market requirements in 
Europe, after spending probably well over a million dollars in scheme development and incurring ongoing 
costs and human energy drain, might give others pause to consider the wisdom of pursuing this route. The 
more fundamental question probably is whether the market will require sustainability eco-labeling on a 
long-term basis. 
6.3 There are a lot of politics behind this stuff, and it's hard from my vantage point to know where things 
are going to go. There's definitely a niche for a standard that's cheaper than MSC yet respected by the 
sustainability community. At this point, RFM has its work cut out for it to achieve that respect.  
6.4 Interesting way to put it. The actual clients pursue the certifications and they change. 
6.5 Really depends upon market acceptance. Indications are MSC has broader acceptance than other soft 
processes.  
6.6 The cost and complexity of setting up a seafood eco-certification program would seem to make it 
difficult for very many fisheries to identify or create alternative programs.  
6.7 I think it depends how the improvements turn out.  
6.8 It all depends on how much a government or other body will pay to maintain it.  





Chart 7. Question 6, Do you think more Fisheries will 
Pursue Alternative Eco-label Certification Programs, such 







with any industry - whether that be your cable company, your bank, etc....having a choice is important and 
better than the alternative, which often times is a monopoly.  
6.10 A diversity of eco-labels is likely as seen across other industries and fisheries may seek a number of 
different marks dependent on the requirements of the particular market they are selling into. It is also 
beneficial to have competition between standards to ensure a high level is maintained. 
 




These results suggest that Alaska returned to the MSC program due to market 
requirements in Europe (comments 6.1, 6.2 and 6.11), after spending substantial funds (one 
estimate is well over a million dollars) developing the RFM program (6.2). The trend of 
alternative labelling schemes is seen as both important in order to have a choice (6.9) and 
beneficial to maintain competition between standards to ensure a high level (6.10). It is also 
seen as problem because it can confuse the public (6.1). These findings recommend that 
tough lessons can be learned from the Alaska case about the costs and benefits of trying to 
create an industry program that has similar market traction to independent certification 
schemes (6.2). In addition, they suggest there is a niche for a standard that is cheaper than the 
MSC standard, yet respected by the sustainability community (6.3). The last section of this 
thesis will unify and analyze the conceptual framework, case study of Alaska salmon and 









There is no doubt that eco-labels have increasingly become an important and 
influential instrument of global environmental governance. They have also become an 
illustration of the power surrounding disciplinary neoliberalism. Building on the emerging 
critique of neoliberal or market-oriented governance, and ‘green grabbing’ (Corson, 
MacDonald and Neimark 2013; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012), it is shown that the 
Alaska salmon eco-certification case study contributes to this literature with the State of 
Alaska and the Alaska industry stakeholders aligning with market logics to create and 
commodify new natures (hatchery salmon) through new forms of environmental conservation 
(the market mechanism of ASMI’s FAO-based RFM certification scheme).  
The first section of the conceptual framework discussed eco-labels as a system of 
global governance, defining the concepts of neo-liberalism and governance and explaining 
the shift from state-run governance to non-state, market-driven governance. This shift has 
resulted in an increasing combination of corporations, industry associations, social movement 
organizations and certification bodies being responsible for developing and enforcing 
regulations (Konefal 2012). Environmental regulation has shifted to private actors, or a joint-
public-private undertaking (in this case the MSC and ASMI), relying on market-based 
mechanism of third-party certification to gain credibility and legitimacy (MSC conformance 
criteria, Global Trust and RFM Fisheries Standard). Since neoliberalism, and any authority 
system, requires continual legitimization, establishing legitimacy for voluntary eco-
certifications is an important aspect of any labeling scheme. This research investigated the 
motivations and legitimacy of the Alaska industry’s departure from the MSC certification, to 
a label that is owned by the State and heavily influenced by the industry.  
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The second section of the conceptual framework analyzed the legitimacy of eco-
certification systems and the corresponding eco-labels that are used to address collective 
action problems through consumer choices. Today, there are 26 major eco-labels, retail labels 
and consumer guides for fisheries and fishery products alone (FAO Committee on Fisheries 
2014). While several researchers have developed frameworks to analyze the legitimacy of 
certification systems (Ostrom 2005; Dingwerth 2007; Koppell 2010), most of these studies 
focus on the decision-making procedures and policy strategies within a certification system 
(Marx 2013).  
With all the research and attention given to these third party certification systems, it is 
concerning that out of 426 labels accessed from the Eco-label Index database containing eco-
labels operating world-wide from different economic sectors, there is only data for 21 labels. 
Of those cases, only 25 percent use third-party recertification, 45 eco-labels make their audits 
publically available and about 150 eco-labels make use of corrective action plans. Marx’s 
(2013) eco-label research indicates that the granting of many eco-labels is rather flexible. The 
results of this study support Marx’s (2013) findings in a related, but different way. He found 
that the granting of many eco-labels is rather flexible. This study found that it is rather easy 
to create a new eco-label relative to motivations and desired conformance criteria.  
While most eco-labelling programs are independent third party accreditation bodies 
that are developed by NGOs, some eco-labelling programs have been developed by the State 
(MEL-Japan) and the industries themselves (Alaska and Iceland). The third section of the 
conceptual framework showcased these three particular national and sub-national territories 
as examples of states that have moved away from the MSC, and created independent place-
specific, or ‘territorial’ eco-labelling certification programs. This research contributes to 
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Foley and Havice’s (2016) conceptualization of these new fisheries eco-certifications 
emerging as forms of territorial sustainability governance. Their analysis revealed four 
closely related motivations that develop the territoriality as spatial strategy and inform this 
research: to respond strategically to MSC, to respond strategically to the transnational 
sustainable seafood movement, to reassert and demonstrate territorial control over national 
fisheries, and to enhance control over information and communication of territorially-specific 
regulatory and production practices, manifested as a territorialized brand of eco-certification.  
Shedding new light on Foley and Havice’s (2016) conceptualization of territorial 
sustainability governance, while all four of the closely related motivations begin to explain 
the emergence of new fisheries eco-certifications, this research reveals an additional motive. 
The processors and State of Alaska created an alternative eco-certification because there was 
a sustainability concern surrounding hatchery salmon. This sustainability concern was 
perceived to make it more difficult for specifically Prince William Sound and Southeast units 
of certification to get certified. For this reason, the processors and the State of Alaska 
withdrew from the MSC and created their own eco-label. This was achieved through ASMI, 
with Global Trust acting in the capacity of an independent certification body.  
These findings have shown that ASMI’s FAO-based RFM certification fails to meet 
the generally agreed upon standards for eco-certification. The survey has demonstrated that 
in the minds of key observers, the RFM certification criteria compares unfavorably with the 
MSC conformance criteria. As a result, the Alaska eco-certification case is an example of an 
alternative eco-labelling scheme that has culminated in a discrepancy of market mechanism 
disciplinary discourse logic through a ratcheting down of market wide performance and 
legitimacy for sustainability of salmon in Alaska.   
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For market mechanisms to work, there must be demand for a particular sustainability 
problem the global market. Consumer demand is influenced by an awareness of 
environmental problems.  Most people in the world are unaware of the effect industrial  
hatcheries are having on wild stocks in the North Pacific. People must become aware of the 
particular environmental problem in order for the market mechanism to correct itself. The 
world needs to know that Alaska, Russia and Japan are engaged in industrial hatchery 
activities that are negatively impacting wild stocks. People worldwide also need to know that 
these hatchery fish are sold as ‘wild salmon’ in the global market. Consumer awareness of 
this problem can influence the market mechanism to adjust in ratcheting up standards. Some 
possible ways are by putting pressure on the MSC to adjust their conformance criteria to 
correct this issue, or by differentiating hatchery from wild fish in the market place.  
To be clear, not all salmon hatchery programs are inherently bad. They began with 
good intention to help boost wild runs to sustainable numbers. Low impact hatchery projects 
can be effective in helping to restore wild stocks. However, what has occurred is the shift to 
industrial hatcheries where entirely new superficial runs have been created that are terminal. 
These are in no way natural. Helping a run recover is fundamentally different from a man-
made economic stimulus terminal salmon stock. Scaling back industrial hatcheries in the 
North Pacific is a precautionary principle to ensure wild stocks survive. Research needs to 
focus on how to identify hatchery activity that is actually helping wild stocks and how to 
differentiate these hatchery programs from the industrial ones that are harming wild salmon. 
How can an eco-label provide a mechanism in the market place to differentiate healthy wild 
salmon stocks and successful low impact hatchery programs from industrial hatcheries that 
are harming wild salmon in the North Pacific?  
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Implications 
Environmental governance promises to deliver legitimate mechanisms to address 
environmental problems. Voluntary codes, initiatives and eco-label certifications are 
important non-state market-based tools in this new form of global environmental governance. 
It has become a popular tool because new eco-label certification schemes can be created to 
differentiate products; thereby, allowing consumers to make responsible purchasing choices. 
This case study shows a discrepancy in this logic because Alaska stakeholders circumvented 
sustainability concerns by setting up its own eco-label program. 
Eco-labels are supposed to generate both a ratcheting up of market-wide 
environmental performance and legitimacy. The benefit of eco-labelling programs is the 
environmental good resulting from this ratcheting up. The findings of this study have 
important repercussions because it calls into question the legitimacy of eco-labelling 
schemes. Since eco-labels are pursued, and in part funded by industry, market-based 
mechanisms are susceptible to being influenced by those who are paying for the service. This 
is especially true when the industry seeking third-party certification does not like the 
sustainability recommendations resulting from the independent review of their resource.   
There is a fundamental divide between industry and conservation interests. Industry’s 
intent is to maximize profits, while conservation organizations desire to implement the best 
possible sustainability practices. Environmental marketing from an eco-label is a 
compromise that bridges the gap between the two motives. It is an arrangement that attempts 
to compensate industry for loss resulting from good resource management. The eco-label 
adds value by distinguishing the product as environmentally responsible. The Alaska 
processors returned to MSC after resisting it for two years because European markets refused 
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to buy salmon that was not MSC certified. This Alaska salmon eco-certification case study 
shows that a credible eco-label is valuable.  
Non-state market-based mechanisms must be transparent to be legitimate. Academia 
can contribute to achieving transparency by being a safe place for stakeholders to share their 
experience and expertise of the mechanism in place, without fear of the information being 
held against them. Nearly everyone who was contacted to participate in this research project 
was insistent on anonymity because of the possible repercussions on their career for sharing 
controversial information that is in the industry’s interest to keep undisclosed. Stakeholders 
were concerned because the industry has the ability to influence which independent 
assessment body will conduct the resource evaluation. This facet of the eco-labelling 
certification system is questionable because industry interests have the ability to influence 
objective resource assessments through selection of the experts. Essentially, redacting the 
most progressive science and management recommendations for a particular fishery.  
These findings progress the research within the field of environmental governance 
because academic researchers engaged in interdisciplinary work have the ability to straddle 
multiple worlds and disciplines. This vantage allows the researcher to see a bigger picture, 
helping identify and solve environmental problems. Researchers in environmental politics 
have the opportunity to bring more transparency and accountability to the market mechanism 
through illuminating the architecture of the eco-label, which straddles the interests of 






This thesis has investigated why the major Alaska salmon processors withdrew from 
the MSC certification in 2012 and joined ASMI’s FAO-based RFM program. Hypothesizing 
that there were factors beyond the cited reason of the cost of the MSC label, this study has 
uncovered evidence that Alaska circumvented salmon sustainability by creating its own eco-
label.  
These findings contribute to the global environmental governance discipline with 
problem driven research that advances our understanding of a new motivation behind a 
territorial entity creating an alternative standard for fisheries certification. The study also 
reveals an example of an alternative eco-label that has resulted in a ratcheting down of 
market wide performance and legitimacy for fishery resources. The main reason FAO-based 
RFM certification not co-exist with the MSC certification in Alaska is because the State of 
Alaska would need to address the sustainability of their hatchery management program. 
However, addressing these discrepancies and the problems of the hatchery management 
program would contribute to an erosion of the Alaska brand. For these reasons, the 
motivation for the major Alaska salmon processors pulling out from the MSC and creating 
ASMI's RFM program was in order to gain an eco-certification for Alaska salmon 
(specifically salmon created by artificial hatchery production) by means of a less 
stringent conformance criteria that were owned and controlled by the major processors, the 
State of Alaska and Alaska stakeholders. As a result, ASMI's initial RFM program is an 
example of a ratcheting down of market-wide performance and legitimacy for sustainability 
governance of fisheries in the global economy.   
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The e-survey and phone interview results verify that hatcheries engaged in industrial 
salmon production are the contested environmental concern in this case study and the catalyst 
for the Alaskan processors withdrawing from the MSC recertification in 2012. There is 
agreement among key respondents that the major salmon processors withdrew from the MSC 
reassessment because pre-assessment discussions led the processors to believe that Prince 
William Sound and Southeast areas would have difficulty getting certified. MSC certifies 
wild stock fisheries, but both Prince William Sound and Southeast regions have transitioned 
to large-scale hatchery production that in some cases dwarf local stocks. This is congruent 
with Table 2 (see appendix), which shows the regional percentage Alaska commercial 
harvest of hatchery-produced salmon from 2010-2014, and the five-year average. The Prince 
William Sound region average by far topped the chart at 77 percent, compared to Southeast’s 
15 percent.  
Industrial salmon hatcheries in the North Pacific are a problem because they are 
hurting the survival of wild runs. In addition, hatchery salmon are sold as ‘wild’ in the global 
market. Yet most people are unaware of both these facts. For a market mechanisms to work, 
consumers must be educated in environmental problems and demand a ratcheting up of 
sustainability standards. A ratcheting up of standards can help to solve the sustainability 
problem of industrial hatchery salmon present not just in Alaska, but throughout the North 
Pacific as well.  
It cannot be denied that there is a niche for a standard that is less expensive than the 
MSC, yet respected by the sustainability community. At this point, these results show that 
ASMI’s RFM program has not achieved that respect and legitimacy held by the MSC 
standard. Due to ongoing evaluation and reform efforts, it cannot be determined if ASMI’s 
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current FAO-based RFM program is a legitimate market mechanism of environmental 
governance. For this reason, more research is needed to make a determination if an industry 
owned and operated conformance criteria and eco-label can actually be legitimate and 
meaningful.  
Given the sheer number of eco-labels that are present today, and the reality that new 
eco-labels are likely to continue emerging, it cannot be denied that there is a future risk of a 
ratcheting down of market-wide performance and legitimacy for resource sustainability 
through use of eco-certifications in the global economy. It is crucial that problem driven 
research continues in all sectors of natural resource based industries in order to uncover 
instances of green grabbing and to identify eco-labels that are not legitimate forms of 
sustainability governance.  The discipline of environmental politics is in a unique position to 
act as a watchdog and safe place for non-state market based players and mechanisms. This 
includes being an entity that stakeholders can approach to share expert understanding of the 
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Table 2- Regional Percentage of Alaska Commercial Harvest of CCPH* 
Hatchery Produced Fish, from 2010-2014 and Five Year Average. 
 Southeast PWS Kodiak Cook Inlet 
2010 7.67 88.64 3.59 .10 
2011 20.97 74.61 4.14 .29 
2012 24.46 69.04 6.45 .05 
2013 11.55 77.46 10.96 .05 
2014 11.41 77.24 11.17 .18 
5 year Avg. 15.21 77.40 7.26 .13 
*CCPH- Commercial Common Property Harvest. Data from State of Alaska, Alaska Department of Fish 




































MSC Conditions Relating to State of Alaska Hatchery Use From the Full 2007 Re-
assessment Report (see Chafee 2007). 
 
MSC Principle 1, (13 Conditions). 
Condition 3. Estimate contribution of hatchery chum to wild escapement in representative 
areas through appropriate means, such as implementing thermal otolith mass marking of all 
hatchery chum salmon. [Southeast]  
Condition 11. Same as Condition 3 Estimate contribution of hatchery chum to wild 
escapement in representative areas through appropriate means, such as implementing thermal 
otolith mass marking of all hatchery salmon. [Southeast]  
Condition 13. Same as Condition 3 - Where agreed by ADF&G and the certification body 
conducting annual surveillance audits under the MSC program, implement new estimates of 
productivity on wild salmon and incorporate appropriate changes in fishery management. 
[Southeast]  
Condition 15. Same as Condition 3 Estimate contribution of hatchery chum to wild 
escapement in representative areas through appropriate means, such as implementing thermal 
otolith mass marking of all hatchery chum salmon.  [Southeast]  
Condition 18. Evaluation of hatchery stray rates of coho in representative natural spawning 
populations. [SE/Yakutat Troll]  
Condition 23 - Provide adequate data and analyses to demonstrate that hatchery and fishery 
management actions are sufficient to ensure that harvest of enhanced fish is not adversely 
affecting the wild pink, chum, sockeye, and coho stocks. Revise wild stock assessments and 
management as appropriate. [Prince William Sound] 
Condition 24. Estimate the contributions of stray hatchery chum and sockeye to spawning 
escapements and report results. [Prince William Sound]  
Condition 25. Same as Condition 23   
Condition 27. Provide a written evaluation of the effects of potentially selective hatchery 
practices on characteristics of un-enhanced wild stocks. [Prince William Sound]  
Condition 29. Conduct a review of the Gulkana sockeye hatchery program with emphasis on 
potential impacts to wild stocks. [Copper/Bering]  
Condition 30. Continue to improve information on contributions of component stocks of 
sockeye and chino salmon to the commercial fisheries by time and area and incorporate 
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appropriate refinements in escapement estimates for target species and enhanced fish. 
Provide a publicly available report that discusses the results. [Copper/Bering]  
Condition 33. Complete revision of Cook Inlet Regional Enhancement Plan including 
specific guidelines consistent with existing sustainable fisheries and genetics policies and 
criteria for evaluating hatchery effectiveness. [Lower Cook Inlet]  
Condition 34. Identify assumptions regarding contributions of enhanced sockeye, pink, and 
chum in natural spawning areas in the Cook Inlet Regional Enhancement Plan and describe 
guidelines which ensure that hatchery contributions to natural escapement are adequately 
considered in fishery management. [Lower Cook Inlet]  
MSC Principle 2 (2 Conditions) 
Condition 62. Support additional investigations of hatchery chum straying into natural 
production areas, including streams that are close to release sites and some streams distant 
from release sites.  
Condition 63. Implement effective hatchery management practices needed to minimize 
hatchery impacts on the genetic diversity and productivity of wild pink and chum stocks in 
Prince William Sound. Effective measures will include: 1) evaluate various on site and 
remote release strategies to identify those that cause significant straying of hatchery-
produced fish into natural production areas, 2) substantially reduce undesirable straying by 
improving or eliminating appropriate strategies, and 3) avoidance of hatchery selection 
practices that alter genetic and life history characteristics of the hatchery stocks relative to the 
local wild stocks. [Prince William Sound]  
MSC Principle 3 (2 conditions) 
Principle 3 considers the management and operational framework of the fisheries. In 
Alaska all commercial salmon fisheries are implemented in a comprehensive statewide 
system by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the Alaska Board of Fisheries. This 
system includes centralized and regional programs for implementation of regional 
commercial salmon fisheries. Because all regional fisheries are managed under the same 
system, this principle was scored for all regions jointly unless exceptions were identified for 
specific indicators.  
Condition 66. Establish and implement a mechanism for periodic formal evaluations of each 
hatchery program for consistency with statewide policies and prescribed management 
practices. This would include a specific evaluation of each program relative to related 
policies and management practices. [All]  
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Condition 67. Complete a comprehensive, formal, written, and externally-reviewed 
evaluation of how the enhancement programs in Prince William Sound protect and sustain 
the genetic structure and productivity of natural stocks in the area. The review should include 
an explanation of how the current programs are consistent with current scientific information 
on hatchery risks to wild stocks, statewide policies, and hatchery practices in other regions of 
Alaska. Based on this review, update the comprehensive regional management and 
enhancement plan to include appropriate policies, objectives, and practices comparable to 
those identified in the comprehensive enhancement plan for southeast Alaska. [Prince 
William Sound]  




























































RESOLUTION 2013 -1 
 
 
A RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED FISHERMEN OF ALASKA SUPPORTING 
THE STATE OF ALASKA AND THE ALASKA SEAFOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE’S 
DECISION TO OFFER THIRD PARTY FISHERIES CERTIFICATION AND TO SEEK 
ALTERNATIVE CERTIFICATION CRITERIA UNDER INTERNATIONALLY 
RECOGNIZED STANDARDS.  
 
WHEREAS,  Alaska seafood has been sustainably managed since statehood; and 
 
WHEREAS, the State of Alaska Constitution requires that Alaska Salmon “shall be utilized, 
developed and maintained on the sustained yield principle”; and  
 
WHEREAS, Alaska’s salmon management, including the development of the hatchery program, 
has been internationally recognized as the best managed salmon fisheries in the 
world; and  
 
WHEREAS,  the State of Alaska and Alaska’s seafood industry have created the Alaska Seafood 
Marketing Institute to educate Alaska’s seafood customers about the sustainability 
of Alaska seafood and to promote Alaska salmon  as wild,  natural and responsibly 
managed; and 
 
WHEREAS, the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute has worked for 30 years to market the 
Alaska brand and to have Alaska seafood consumers associate Alaska with 
sustainable, wild, natural and responsibly managed fisheries; and 
 
WHEREAS, the Alaska brand logo is one of the most recognized seafood identifiers in the world 
encouraging Alaska seafood sales both nationally and internationally; and  
 
WHEREAS, sale of Alaska seafood provides significant economic benefits to coastal and rural 
Alaska, including fishermen, processors, processing workers, businesses and 
communities; and  
 
WHEREAS, economic benefits to rural and coastal Alaska from seafood sales support 
transportation, retail, supply, and energy business in urban Alaska and throughout 


































































Informed Consent Form 
Purpose and Benefit: 
 
The role that eco-labels can have in creating sustainable fisheries around the world 
has been previously examined. This study continues research into the future of eco-labels in 
the fishing industry, particularly the factors that influence participation with and legitimacy 
of voluntary sustainability eco-labeling schemes. The purpose of this investigation is to 
examine the factors that influenced a group of Alaska's salmon processors from withdrawing 
their support of the Marine Stewardship Council's certification, and instead engaging with the 
Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute's Responsible Fisheries Management program. The 
results of this study will advance understanding as to why an alternative standard was needed 
to verify the sustainability of fishery resources.  
 
I UNDERSTAND THAT: 
 
1) My involvement will include filling out a questionnaire and/or participating in a 
telephone or in person interview. My participation will involve approximately 20 
minutes.  
2) There are no anticipated risks or discomfort associated with participation. One possible 
benefit for me may be a better understanding of the research process. 
3) My participation is voluntary, I may choose not to answer certain questions or withdraw 
from participation at any time without penalty.  
4) All information is confidential. My signed consent form will be kept in a locked cabinet 
separate from the questionnaires. My name will not be associated with any of my 
responses at any time. 
5) My signature on this form does not waive my legal rights of protection. 
6) This master’s thesis is supervised by Dr. Singleton. Any questions that you have about 
the study or your participation may be directed to her at 360-650-4880. I (Monique 
Couture) can be contacted at couturm@students.wwu.edu. 
 
If you have any questions about your participation or your rights as a research participant, you can 
contact the WWU Human Protections Administration (HPA), 360-650-3220 or 
janai.symons@wwu.edu 
If during or after participation in this study you suffer from any adverse effects as a result of 
participation, please notify the researcher directing the study or the WWU Human Protections 
Administrator.  
 
I have read the above description and agree to participate in this study. 
_____________________________    ___________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
*NOTE: Please sign both copies of the form and   
_____________________________  retain the copy marked “Participant.” If this was  
Participant’s PRINTED NAME  sent to you electronically, you are encouraged to 
print out a copy for your records. 
 
